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INTRODUCTION 
The formation of the United Nations and the Special-
ized Agencies in the years following the war was an action 
motivated primarily by a sincere desire on the part of 
vi 
the world to make a serious attempt to avoid and minimize 
all causes and conflicts which might, directly or indirect-
ly, lead to an even more devastating war. As these causes 
can stem from any number of factors, whether political, 
sociological, economic or cultural, the UN and the Special-
ized Agencies contain organs that are specifically designed 
to alleviate and improve conditions and factors which might 
have as effect an outbreak of hostilities or invitation to 
exploitation. Of the factors mentioned above, we can 
safely say that economic and social conditions rank among 
the most important. Therefore, we find in the United 
Nations, under the title of Technical Assistance Programme, 
a medium through which an attempt is made to better the 
economic and social conditions of the world. The Progrannne 
functions as a co-ordinator for the Specialized Agencies, 
thereby unifying the endeavor in their respective fields 
into an alloy that is stronger and more effective than any 
one of its ingredient. 
This thesis is an attempt to explain and define the 
work done by the Technical Assistance Programme and the 
Specialized Agencies in Libya. This particular country 
was chosen for a number of reasons. The most important 
is that Libya is an experimental case in UN history. 
This country, which had been an Italian colony before the 
war, was granted its independence by the UN after a short 
transitional period of British and French administration. 
Once this decision was taken by the General Assembly in 
1949, a UN Commissioner was sent out to Libya, where he 
spent two years helping the Libyans prepare themselves 
for independence. 
This thesis, then, is an analysis of the technical 
assistance provided by the UN from the time it assumed 
responsibility to the present. 
I have focused this work primarily on the activities 
of the Food and Agriculture Organization for two reasons: 
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a detailed dissertation of the technical assistance projects 
of all the Specialized Agencies, even in a single country, 
would add little more than repetitive detail and would 
extend this thesis beyond the limits necessary to accom-
plish its purpose; Libya is primarily an agricultural 
country, and, by and large, all projects initiated there 
are fUndamentally for the purpose of increasing agricul-
tural productivity. 
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The bulk of the material used for research was made 
up largely of UN publications, documents, reports and ar-
ticles. Much of this material was extremely detailed and 
technical, and while the reports compiled by the experts 
in the preliminary phase of technical assistance are all 
available, there exists no clear and concise compilation 
of the work done by technical assistance in Libya since 
it attained national independence. 
The only additional method through which information 
could have been gained would have been to make a survey 
in Libya, personally interviewing the technical assistance 
personnel and studying existing projects. This, however, 
for various reasons I was unable to do. 
At the present time, the question of a Special United 
Nations Fund for Economic Development is still under dis-
cussion in the United Nations. Should any definite state-
ments be made on its establishment within the next few 
months, these will be incorporated within the final draft 
of this thesis. The same consideration applies to the 
possible discovery of oil resources in Libya. Both these 
developments would have a considerable influence on the 
future of Libyan economic development and would, there-
fore, change my conclusions to a certain extent. 
I have found that the reports and documents, which 
constitute the majority of my research material, do not 
lend themselves to the traditional bibliographical form 
intelli gibly. Therefore, I have taken the liberty of 
listing FAO and UN documents chronologically in separate 
sections of the Bibliography. 
i x 
CHAPTER I 
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt expressed 
the eternal hope of mankind in these words from his annual 
message to Congress: 
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, 
we look forward1.to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. 
These Four Freedoms -- freedom from want, freedom from 
fear, and freedom of speech and worship -- comprise the 
basic ideals on which the United Nations and the Specialized 
Agencies are erected. The lack of any or all of them to 
a person or people means an infringement of those rights 
which are considered by many political scientists and phi-
:}.osophers to be inalienable. Freedom from want, the de-
ficiency of which is very often felt most strongly because 
of direct physical effects, can be guaranteed most easily 
because of its tangibility. The alleviation of hunger 
and famine can be accomplished in a number of ways. One 
technique is that of bestowing the food outright as chari-
ty; another is to demand remuneration for food given, very 
often payment greatly disproportionate to the goods. Both. 
l 
of these methods often prove to be psychologically distruc-
tive, subsequently damaging the individual far more than 
he was at the outset. Finally, aid may be given through 
various systems leading to self-improvement, such as edu- . 
cation. The Food and Agriculture Organization follows this 
latter principle in an attempt to increase the standard of 
living in underdeveloped countries and thereby improve 
world food productivity. 
While plans were being formulated to establish an 
international organization composed of the Great Powers 
and their Allies in World War II, plans were also being 
made to institute an international agency which would be 
primarily concerned with feeding the world and raising 
the standard of living. 
This idea was not a new one. Nutritionists had been 
accumulating knowledge on the subject for a number of years, 
trying to correlate nutrition with health and economics. 
The general depression of the thirties made the problem 
more acute, and it became generally realised that investi-
gations and studies would be necessary if any action were 
. 
to be taken to improve the world's production and distri-
bution of food. 
In 1935, Lord Bruce of the Australian delegation to 
the League of Nations put the problem to the Assembly of 
the League by asking: 
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Is it not possible to marry health and agriculture 
and, by so doing, make a step in the improvement of 
national health, and at the same time, an appreciable 
contribution to the solution of the agricultural prob-
lem?2 
Lord Bruce and his economic advisor, F.L. McDougall, pro-
posed that a study should be made of the question of nu-
trition, not only from the point of view of health, but 
in all its aspects. The proposal was warmly supported 
by a number of other delegations and unanimously accepted 
by the Council. A Mixed Committee on Nutrition, composed 
of experts in the fields of agriculture, medicine, nutri-
tion and economics, set to work, and in 1937 produced a 
report in which it set forth its final conclusions "on 
the relation of nutrition to health, agriculture, and eco-
nomic policy".3 
At this time, however, the world was more interested 
in the activities of Hitler and Mussolini and in stepping 
up rearmament than in matters of economic reconstruction, 
and the whole matter dropped into the background. It is 
ironic to note, however, that the recommendations made 
in the Bruce Report were very effectively carried out by 
several nations, including Great Britain and Germany in 
their war-time rationing programmes. 
The Assembly's interest in nutrition and its subse-
quent action was not unprecedented. Another organization 
interested in agriculture, the International Institute 
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of Agriculture, was formed in 1905 under the sponsorship 
of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy. The idea was originated 
by David Lubin, a California businessman and farmer. He 
became convinced that farmers were at a disadvantageous 
position compared to other businessmen. With the industri-
alization of agriculture and the modification of transpor-
tation, they were forced to trade in a world market about 
which they knew little or nothing. The Institute served 
as a clearing house for information on world agriculture. 
Knowledge was exchanged concerning the quality and quantity 
of crops, methods of fixing prices and manners of facili-
tating production.4 The Institute, when approached by 
Mr. McDougall in 1935 in connection with the Mixed Committee 
on Nutrition, proved to be a disappointment. Conservative 
elements within it were not willing to give their support 
because they were interested primarily in supporting the 
producers, while the Committee was fundamentally concerned 
with consumption. As a result of this action, the Institute 
lost much of its support and popularity. On the whole, 
however, the Institute accomplished some of the necessary 
pioneering and most of its work and its library were taken 
over by the Food and Agriculture Organization subsequently. 
Although the war was not won by 1943, the Allies were 
confident enough of its outcome to start thinking of post-
war problems. Sir John Boyd Orr and Mr. McDougall, both 
in Washington at this time, tried to gain the interest of 
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scientists and experts in the idea of an international 
organization based on the total conception of nutrition; 
that is, in relation to health, economics and agricultur e. 
The matter was finally brought to the attention of Presi-
dent Roosevelt, who enthusiastically supported the idea. 
The result was the United Nations Conference on Food and 
Agriculture, for which the representatives of forty-four 
nations met on May 18, 1943, at Hot Springs, Virginia, 
on the invitation of the President. The delegates at the 
conference declared: 
The first step toward freedom from want of food must 
not await the final solution of all other problems. 
Each advance made in one field will strengthen and 
quicken advance in all others. Once the war has been 
won gecisive steps can be taken. We must be ready 
now. 
Putting this idea into action, the delegates elected an 
Interim Commission empowered to draw up the Constitution 
for a permanent food and agriculture organization. The 
Commission met in Washington in July, 1943, and by August, 
1944, it had completed its work and was able to present 
its constitution to the governments concerned . Of the 
forty-four invited powers, thirty-eight signed the consti-
tution, and the First Conference of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization was held in Quebec in the fall of 1945. 
The aims of the Organization as expressed in the Pre-
amble are: 
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.•• raising the levels of nutrition and standards of 
living of the peoples under their respective juris-
dictions; securing improvements in the efficiency 
of the production and distribution of all food and 
agricultural products; bettering the condition of 
rural populations; and thus contributing toward an 
expanding world economy.6 
FAO is no super-state; it has no strong powers to direct 
and no capital funds to invest in agricultural developments. 
The functions of the Organization as expressed in the 
Constitution are divided into the following categories: 
1. to collect, analyse, interpret, and disseminate 
information relating to food, nutrition, and agricul-
ture; 
2. to promote and recommend national and international 
action with respect to research, the improvement of 
education and administration and the spreading of 
knowledge; the conservation and improvement of methods 
of production; the improvement of processing, marketing 
and distribution of agricultural products; and the 
adoption of adequate international credit and commodity 
agreements; 
3. to furnish such technical assistance as governments 
may request and organize with the governments concerned 
the needed missions to assist in carrying out these 
recommendations.7 
FAO, then, is a co-ordinator and initiator of international 
action where national attempts have proven themselves in-
suf.ficient, as well as an international clearing house 
where the member nations can pool their information and 
experiences. 
The organization of FAO is a simple one consisting 
o.f a Conference, an Executive Committee, a Director Gen-
eral, Technical and Regional Standing Committees, Missions, 
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and a staff of international civil servants. The Conference, 
where all the member nations are represented by a delegate 
empowered with a single vote, must meet at least once each 
year. The delegates are not politicians in the sense of 
being diplomats representing their countries, but are ex-
perts, nutritionists, farmers, technicians, and scientists. 
The Conference may invite any public international agency, 
which has responsibilities related to those of FAO, to 
appoint a representative without the right to vote to at-
tend the meetings. It has, as general functions, the power 
to determine policy and approve the budget of the organi-
zation. In addition, it may, by a two thirds vote, make 
recommendations to any of its members for national action 
on matters relating to food and agriculture, and can sub-
mit conventions to member nations with concerted action 
as a goal. These conventions must be ratified by the nation-
al legislature of each member country. It also has the 
power to make recommendations to any public international 
organization regarding matters pertaining to the purposes 
of the Organization. 
The Executive Committee, which acts for the Conference 
between sessions, consists of nine to fifteen members who 
are appointed by the Conference. They are selected with 
a view toward as varied geographic, agricultural and eco-
nomic backgrounds as possible, and must represent the Organi-
zation rather than their own governments. Their powers 
are delegated to them by the Conference. 
Both the Executive Conunittee and the Conference have 
the power to establish Technical and Regional Standing 
Committees, and may appoint teams to study and make reports 
on matters related to the aims of FAO. They may also con-
vene technical, general or other special conferences, and 
may provide representation at such conferences of national 
and international bodies that are concerned with food, 
agriculture and connected subjects.8 
The Director General, appointed by the Conference, 
has full power to direct the work of the Organization sub-
ject to the general supervision of the Conference and the 
Executive Committee. He, or his representative, partici-
pates, without the right to vote, in all meetings of the 
Conference and the Executive Committee. 
The staff of the agency is appointed by the Director 
General, and its responsibility lies exclusively with the 
Director General and FAO, in that employees are forbidden 
to receive instructions from any authority other than the 
Organization. An attempt is made to recruit the staff 
on as wide a geographical basis as possible. To facilitate 
the work of FAO throughout the world, the Director General 
may establish regional offices and appoint officials with-
in particular countries or areas at the consent of the 
governments concerned.9 
The members of FAO are requested to submit periodic 
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reports on the progress made toward achieving the purposes 
of the agency and about action taken on the recommendations 
and conventions passed by the Conference. In addition, 
the member countries communicate any publications, laws, 
official reports and statistics concerning food and agri-
culture that have appeared in their respective countries. 
Fully cognizant of the growing trend toward functional 
international agencies, FAO took steps to provide for co-
ordination and co-operation if such need should arise. 
Article XII of the Charter of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization states: 
••• in order to provide for close co-operation between 
the Organization· and other public international organi-
zations with related responsibilities, the Conference 
may •• enter into agreements with the competent au-
thorities of such organizations defining the distri-
bution of responsibilities and methods of co-operation. 
The Director General may, subject to any decisions 
of the Conference, enter into agreements with other 
public international organizations for the maintenance 
of common services, for common arrangements in regard 
to recruitment, trainin§, conditions of service, and 
other related matters.l 
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As other international organizations were formed, FAO entered 
into agreements with. these organizations. 11 In general, 
these agreements provide for close co-operation and regular 
consultation in regard to matters of common concern, re-
ciprocal representation at meetings, the use of joint com-
mittees to consider matters of common interest, reciprocal 
exchange of documents, information and statistics. 
Many questions, however, proved to be not only of 
interest to two or more of the Specialized Agencies, but 
also to the United Nations. Recognizing this fact, the 
framers of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco 
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inserted a number of articles specifically aimed at clari-
fying this problem. Article 57 of the United Nations Charter 
states that "the various specialized agencies ••• shall be 
brought into relationship with the United Nations".12 
Article XIII of the FAO Charter shows the same foresight: 
"The Organization shall ••• constitute a part of any 
general international organization to which may be 
entrusted the co-ordination of the activities of inter-
nationil organizations with specialized responsibil-
ities. 3 
The Organization was brought into relationship with 
the United Nations by an agreement approved by the second 
session of the Conference in September, 1946, and by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations during its first 
session in the fall of the same year. The agreement pro-
vides for reciprocal representation without vote at meetings 
of organs of both organizations where matters of mutual 
concern are being discussed, and it contains provisions 
for assuring the consideration by FAO of any recommendations 
made by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council. Furthermore, FAO pledges itself to assist the 
Economic and Social Council in furnishing information and 
assistance to the Security Council and the Trusteeship 
Council. And finally, the agreement provides for extensive 
administrative and technical service exchange and the de-
velopment of common personnel standards, methods and ar-
rangements so as to facilitate close co-operation. 
Besides the need for administrative co-ordination 
between the Specialized Agencies and the United Nations, 
it was recognized at San Francisco that the co-ordination 
of the policies and activities of the Specialized Agencies 
would be an important task of the United Nations. The 
powers of the UN in this area are limited in that they 
are restricted to study, discussion, negotiation and re-
commendation. The General Assembly is the organ which is 
primarily responsible for the execution of these responsi-
bilities, and although the Economic and Social Council is 
given detailed functions and powers, it always acts "under 
the authority and with the approval of the General Assem-
blyn .14 
Although the agreement between FAO and the UN provided 
for co-operation and co-ordination between the two bodies, 
this function proved to be primarily in the administrative 
and informative fields. It was not until 1948 that the 
principle of policy and activities co-ordination was put 
into effect with the establishment of the Expanded Programme 
for Technical Assistance. 
The need for a comprehensive programme to assist in 
the maturation of underdeveloped countries had been acknow-
ledged for a number of years. Through reports, surveys 
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and statistics, it was discovered that the gap between under-
developed and developed countries is growing greater by 
the decade. 15 In recent years the peoples of the under-
developed countries have come to realize that raising their 
standard of living is the most efficient way of combatting 
this increasing chasm; the more developed countries are 
realizing that in an increasingly interdependent world 
the fact of great wealth in a few countries and poverty 
in the remaining vast majority is a basis of the present 
universal social and economic instability. The narrowing 
of this gap is, therefore, an imperative and urgent task 
for both developed and underdeveloped countries. In the 
past, private initiative and capital have been the prin-
cipal resources for economic development. But as the role 
of government in national affairs grew, so did the responsi-
bility of these governments in the field of international 
finance and development. 
With the establishment of the United Nations and the 
Specialized Agencies, economic development has assumed 
progressively greater importance, and all the agencies 
concerned have been providing extensive aid to their member 
countries. It was during the third session of the General 
Assembly of the UN in 1948 that this body began laying 
the groundwork for further expansion in economic develop-
ment. A few months later, in January, 1949, President 
Truman, in his address to Congress, introduced the idea 
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of an enlarged and more comprehensive programme for develop-
ment in the economic field, embodied in his Point Four 
Programme. In March of the same year, the Economic and 
Social Council passed a resolution on the proposal of the 
United States Delegation requesting that: 
•.• the Secretary General, in consultation with the 
executive heads of the interested agencies ••• to pre-
pare a report for the ninth session of the Council 
setting forth; 
1. a comprehensive . plan for an expanded co-operative 
programme of technical assistance for economic develop-
ment through the United Nations and the specialized 
agencies, paying due attention to questions of a social 
nature which directly condition economic development. 
2. methods of financing such a programme including 
special budgets; and 
3. ways of co-ordigating the planning and execution 
of the programme.lb 
In November, 1949, the General Assembly dealt with 
the report prepared by the Secretary General and the heads 
" fl of the interested agencies, together with the accompanying 
observations and guiding principles provided by the Economic 
and Social Council, and on November 16, 1949, unanimously 
approved them. These guiding principles provide the frame-
work within which all programmes of technical assistance 
operate, whether they be educational, agricultural, social, 
economic or cultural. They state that technical assistance 
be given only at the requirement and request of the govern-
ment concerned and be designed to fit the needs of that 
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particular country; that technical experts be chosen on the 
basis of their technical skill and knowledge and their 
understanding of the cultural background and specific needs 
of the country to be assisted; that the services rendered 
should aim at a higher productivity; and that the benefits 
should be distributed widely and equally to contribute 
toward a higher standard of living for the entire popula-
tion. But the recipient country is also bound by certain 
principles; these are that the governments should give 
prompt consideration to the technical advice and, where 
feasible, set the appropriate machinery in motion to see 
that the advice is efficiently carried out; that they should 
assume as much of the costs of technical services as pos-
sible; and that they should provide information on the re-
sults of the technical assistance rendered. 
To finance this programme, the Secretary General, 
as authorized by the General Assembly, set up a Special 
Account for Technical Assistance. Voluntary contributions 
are credited to this account and transfers made to the 
participating organizations exclusively for the technical 
assistance programme.(Table I) 
Among the proposals recommended by the Council and 
adopted by the Assembly to insure co-operative action was 
the establishment of the Technical Assistance Board and 
the Technical Assistance Committee. 
TAB is composed of the heads of the participating 
organizations (i.e., UN, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, WHO, WMO, 
and ITU.). The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the International Monetary Fund, though 
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they do not participate in the Programme and are not mem-
bers of the Board, are represented at its meetings and 
co-operate fUlly in promoting the objectives of the 
Programme. TAB is neither an executive nor an operative 
body. It attempts to ensure that the technical assistance 
provided by the specialized agencies meets the requirements 
of the Programme as a whole. Through the appointment of 
resident technical assistance representatives, it tries 
to achieve a better planning and co-ordination of the ac-
tivities of individual countries. The Expanded Programme 
is only one source of assistance. In many countries where 
the Programme is operating, assistance is also being given 
from other sources; under the regional schemes of the Colombo 
Plan; and in Non-Self-Governing Territories under the pro-
grammes initiated by the Metropolitan governments. TAB, 
in an effort to avoid duplication and achieve co-ordination, 
makes arrangements to provide the exchange of information 
and administrative practices. 
TAO consists of the members of the Economic and Social 
Council. It examines each year's programme presented to 
it by TAB, makes recommendations concerning it to the Coun-
cil and reviews the working relationships between the 
agencies in an attempt to reach to the greatest possible 
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degree of co-ordination. 
It is only through looking at the world-wide activities 
of the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme that one 
can best see how the theory has been put into practice 
and where the greatest achievements have been accomplished. 
There are two ways of doing this. One is by studying the 
work of technical assistance in a number of countries and 
areas. To acquire a comprehensive view in such a study 
would require an immense amount of survey and analysis, 
too great for the scope of this thesis. The other possi-
bility is to choose a country where technical assistance 
has been in progress for a number of years, study its total 
background, discover its problems in the fields of economics, 
agriculture, education and social welfare, and see how the 
introduction of technical assistance has and is helping 
to overcome underdevelopment difficulties. This view by-
passes the disadvantages of the first, but manages to re-
tain all the advantages of both. 
The exemplifying country must incorporate certain 
prerequisites. Primarily, it should have had serious, 
unrelated problems which make it the recipient of a tech-
nical assistance programme encompassing as many agencies 
as possible. An extremely underdeveloped agrarian nation 
would have such broad needs, at the same time giving the 
fundamental role to a single representative organization 
-- FAO. A country possessing both these conditions and, 
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in addition, lacking statehood, was turned over to the United 
Nations in 1948. 
Libya, under the sponsorship and tutelage of the UN, 
became an experiment which was to prove that a country 
could gain independence through the assistance of peaceful 
international bodies. 
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CHAPTER II 
LIBYA - HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
Geography and strategic position have been the main 
contributing factors in the history of Libya. It has been, 
throughout the ages~ a meeting place between the Mediter-
ranean basin and the Sudan~ between the East and the West. 
The two provinces~ Tripolitania and Cyrenaica~ have always 
been~ geographically and historically, two very distinct 
regions. Tripolitania, founded by the Phoenicians, depended 
commercially on Carthage and was, therefore, mainly con-
cerned and connected with the West, while Cyrenaica, founded 
by the Greeks, tended to look toward the Levant and Egypt. 
Their history, until the sixteenth century, is marked by 
foreign domination, intra-tribal feuds and periods of great 
wealth interspersed by periods of extreme misery. In the 
sixteenth century both provinces came under the nominal 
rule of the Ottoman Empire. Tripolitania was administered 
by a Turkish governor with autocratic powers, while Cyre-
naica remained in a state of complete tribal confusion 
and anarchy. In 1714, Governor Karamanli of Tripoli re-
volted against the Turks and set up a personal dynasty. 
It was during this period that Tripoli became the Mediter-
ranean centre of piracy. In 1855, the Turks, taking swift 
advantage of a civil war, crushed the Karamanlis and re-
established their rule. 
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When the Italians invaded Libya in 1911, they found 
in Cyrenaica a -strong religious movement led by the tribal 
chief of the Senussi. This organization was not a tribe, 
as was generally believed, but a brotherhood made up of 
many races and tribes. It was founded in 1837 by Sayed-
Mohammed-ibn-Ali-el-Senussi, an Algerian who saw and bit-
terly resented the French occupation of his country. A 
prominent part of his teachings was the detestation of 
all Christians, Jews and even those who were under foreign 
·domination or influence. The order established itsel:f 
in Kufra, an almost impenetrable oasis in Cyrenaica. The 
fraternity spread rapidly and soon gained more authority 
in the area than did the Turkish overlords. They developed 
the trans-Saharan caravan route and secured monopoly over 
the slave trade, at the same time acting as middlemen in 
the transportation of European arms to the African hinter-
land. With the coming of the Italians into Tripolitania, 
they realized that their outlet for slaves and the import 
of arms would be threatened. Their chance for revenge came 
with World War I. The Senussi submerged their aversion 
for the Turks in a common bond of hatred toward the Italians 
:and formed an alliance, thus receiving aid in the form or 
arms, money and military advice. Additional help came from 
Germany, the third party to the alliance. The Senussi not 
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only fought the Italians ~n Tripolitania and the French 
in the Sahara, but also organized a campaign against the 
English in Egypt, after having been promised that, should 
they succeed, the Senussi leader would be made ruler of 
Egypt. The attack failed, however, and the leader was 
forced to flee to Constantinople in a German submarine. 
The brotherhood then elected as their leader, Idriss, the 
man who is now king of Libya. In 1917, he signed a joint 
agreement with England and Italy to help them against the 
Germans. After the war, however, Italy recommenced her 
interrupted invasion and occupation of Libya. Soon the 
Italians realized that they and the Senussi could not exist 
together 1n Cyrenaica, and all efforts were aimed at des-
troying the Senussi brotherhood. A massive and grandiose 
expedition was sent to Kufra, and the oasis was captured 
in two hours. It seemed as if Sennusism was a dying cause. 
But during World War II, the Senussi sheiks 1n exile in 
Cairo made an agreement with the British, forming the British-
Libyan Force. They took part in the first and subsequent 
occupations of Cyrenaica and in the defense of Tobruk in 
1941. On January 8, 1942, Anthony Eden, Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, paid tribute in the House of Commons 
to the British-Libyan Force when he declared that the Se-
nussi must never again come under Italian domination. 
The importance of this rather detailed history of the 
Senussi order is that it shows how a movement that was 
predominantly religious at its inception became also polit-
ical as a result of the external forces working on it. 
If the Senussi had been allowed to exist in isolation and 
uninterfered with, it is probable that it would have re-
mained primarily a religious brotherhood. The invasion 
of the Turks and the Italians, however, made it necessary 
for them to fight for their existence, and, as a result 
of this, their orientation became increasingly political. 
In the early 1940's, they regarded themselves as a cohesive 
unit and proved to be a nucleus around which the national 
sentiments in Libya were centered. 
After the defeat of the Italians in 1943, the country 
was divided into its three natural provinces: Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica under British administration and the Fezzan, 
which was administered by the French who had marched up 
from Lake Chad -under General Leclerc. This arrangement 
was to be temporary until the Foreign Powers should decide 
what the future of the former Italian colonies would be. 
The question was debated throughout the period 1945-1948 
by the Council of Foreign Ministers. No agreement could 
be reached, however, as all the Major Powers, as well as 
some of the smaller nations, had their own personal reasons 
for wanting a number of varied actions taken on the issue. 
The question was referred to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in the fall of 1948. The debates continued 
throughout that and the following sessions of the General 
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Assembly, while no compromise of any kind seemed possible. 
Finally, on November 21, 1949, the General Assembly passed, 
I 
with an overwhelming majority, the resolution that had been 
recommended to it by the First Committee, the Political 
Committee of the General Assembly (Appendix B). 
In January, 1950, the United Nations Commissioner, Mr. 
Adrian Pelt, made his first visit to Libya, traveling through 
the country, meeting with local dignitaries, and speaking 
to the British and French Administrative Powers concerning 
their respective roles in carrying out the resolution (Ap-
pendix B, Paragraph 10). 
The political developments in the period between the 
arrival or the Commissioner in 1950 and the declaration 
or independence in January~ 1952, can be divided into three 
very broad phases. On July 25, 1950, a Preparatory Commit-
tee of Twenty-One was set up, consisting of seven members 
representing each of the provinces. The task of this com-
mittee was to recommend a method of election, including 
the composition or the National Assembly and the drafting 
of the Constitution. 
The Assembly, composed of sixty members, twenty from 
each territory, and appointed in conformity with the reso-
lution adopted by the Co~ttee of Twenty-One, met for the 
first time on November 25, 1950. From that time until De-
cember, 1952, the following broad developments took place: 
the Assembly established a provisional government, which 
was formed in the spring of 1951; authority was progres-
sively transferred by the Administrative Powers to this 
government; and technical assistance was initiated and 
developed. 
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The third step toward independence was achieved in 
October, 1951, when the National Assembly unanimously 
adopted a Constitution creating an independent, sovereign 
state with a hereditary monarchy and a federal representa-
tive government. 
Geographically speaking, Libya extends over an area 
1 
of approximately 1,750,000 square kilometers, bounded 
by Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, French Equatorial and 
West Africa, Southern Algeria, Tunisia and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Its three component parts, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania 
and the Fezzan, are separated by great desert wastes 
(Figure 1). 
Cyrenaica covers an area of 70,000 square kilometers, 
which is almost entirely desert and practically rainless 
throughout the year. In the north, however, a low plateau 
of limestone receives enough rainfall to permit th~ culti-
vation of cereals and fruit. This plateau falls away to 
plains in the south and east forming slopes which provide 
pasture for sheep-grazing and where barley is grown from 
year to year, as rainfall permits. In the few oases located 
in the southern desert, date palms and some vegetables are 
grown. 
The population of Cyrenaica is estimated at approxi-
mately 300,000, the majority of which is Arab. There is 
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a Jewish minority of about 200 and small Greek and Maltese 
communities. The rural population numbering 215,000 is 
semi-nomadic, mostly inhabiting the coastal plains, where 
they cultivate barley and herd their animals. There is 
little nomadism, as tribal boundaries are well defined. 
It is only in the south, where inadequate rainfall neces-
sitates a greater amount of movement, that tribes leave 
their homes to find grazing ground for their sheep. 
The economy of this region, which is greatly handi-
capped by the lack of natural resources and the under-
development of water and land, is based on barley culti-
vation and livestock raising. On the northern plateau and 
in the coastal belt a negligible amount of wheat, olives, 
vines and other fruit are grown by modern techniques. Wool 
from this region is of high quality- and makes up Cyre-
naica1s chief export. 
Tripolitania, lying between Tunisia and Cyrenaica, 
is 250,000 square kilometers, most of it desert. The popu-
lation, estimated at 800,000, is concentrated in two main 
areas: the narrow coastal belt of oases between Misurata 
and Zuara; and on the northern edge of Jebel, a plateau 
running eastward from the Tunisian border to the coast. 
The Jebel is separated from the coastal strip by a wedge 
·of arid grassland, which, to the south and west of the 
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J ebel, becomes desert and semi-desert country suitable 
only for sheep and goat herding and the shifting cultiva-
t ion of barley. The total area of productive land varies 
with the annual rainfall, but only about 1 .6 per cent of 
the area is devoted to static farming. 
Tripolitania's urban population is about 165,000, of 
which 105,000 are Moslems living in the towns and princi-
pally engaged in small trade and handicrafts. Most of 
the rural population is settled farmers living in the Jebel 
and the coastal belts. Semi- nomads are numerous, but . it is 
difficult to classify the population according to their 
individual ways of life, as many of the sedentary farmers 
combine static farming with pastoralism and a shifting 
cereal cultivation. The closely-knit tribal structure 
which characterizes Cyrenaica is only found among the nomads 
and hill tribes of Tripolitania. In the more prosperous 
and populated coastal areas, the tribe is slowly giving 
way to a village and city society. The minorities of the 
province comprise about 45,000 Italians, 13,000 Jews and 
2 ,000 Maltese. Of these, the Italian population is extremely 
important in that it has developed extensive commercial 
and agricultural interests, which have proven to be immense-
ly beneficial to the slowly developing Libyan economy. 
The economic status of Tripolitania is based on agri-
culture, animal husbandry and fisheries. The principal 
crops are olives, barley, grapes and citrus fruits. The 
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greatest economic asset of the country is the Italian plan-
tations, both private farms and para-statal settlements. 
Owing to the long period of immaturity of the olive trees, 
these have begun to demonstrate their full productivity 
only in the case of the Italian plantings; those introduced 
by FAO will not effect the Libyan economy for some time. 
The third province, the Fezzan, is a large depression 
covering some 800,000 square kilometers and surrounded 
by a plateau which isolates it from the sea and neighboring 
lands. Within the depression lie three important oases --
Sebha, Brak and Murzuk -- around which is grouped the seden-
tary population. The rest of the area is practically desert 
with a few sparsely placed palm trees. 
The population of the Fezzan is approximately 50,000, 
of which 20 per cent are nomads and semi-nomads. In the 
north these are the tribe of fair-skinned stock with strong 
Berber influence. Ethnically, the sedentary population 
is mixed, containing elements of both fair-skinned and 
dark-skinned races. This population can be divided into 
two groups: three-quarters of the people are poor and under-
fed; the remaining quarter, consisting of landowners, traders 
and officials, live in relatively middle class conditions. 
The subsistence economy of the area is based on an 
oasis palm-garden culture, and is severely handicapped 
by a primitive irrigation system and a subsequent lack 
of water. The area's chief resource is the date palm, 
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but its poor quality and the high cost of transportation 
limit its export value to a marked degree. Local produc-
tion of grain is insufficient to meet the needs of the 
population and must be supplemented by imports. The ex-
tremely low standard of living has resulted in a high annual 
migration to Tripolitania, fUrther aggravating the man-
power shortage in the Fezzan. 
As a whole, then, Libya is an under-developed country 
with a marginal agricultural economy, basically handicapped 
by inadequate rainfall and poor soil. The indigenous popu-
lation is untrained in the proper utilization of land and 
the conservation of water, and is further ,hampered by the 
lack of material resources and technical knowledge, which 
precludes their tapping underground water through methods 
other than simple and highly inefficient surface wells. 2 
The United Nations Commissioner fully realized that 
UN atd to the Libyan people toward their political inde-
pendence should be -- in fact, had to be -- paralleled 
by an extensive programme of technical assistance in the 
economic, social and cultural fields. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. All statistics in this 
United Nations, ~An;··~n~u~a~l~R~e~o~r~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
missioner in Libya, Doc. A 13 
2 • Ibid. , p. 27. 
CHAPTER III 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ANALYSES 
AND PROPOSED PROGRAMMES 
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The situation which con~ronted the United Nations 
Commissioner on his arrival in Libya showed little promise 
for a bright and optimistic future. The general economic 
problems that faced the country for.med a vicious circle 
and appeared insurmountable. It has been shown that Libya 
was an under-developed country with a marginal agricultural 
economy; that it was and is further handicapped by inade-
quate rainfall and poor soil. Although large areas are 
desert, the coastal regions and oasis districts of the coun-
try could be developed into producing areas through improved 
methods of irrigation, dry-farming and animal husbandry. 
The indigenous population, however, was totally untrained 
in the proper use of land and conservation of water, and 
lacked the necessary material resources and technical know-
how to put these impr ovements into practice. Any possibil-
ity of increasing the country's exports, thereby improving 
her international balance of trade, and increasing her 
bilateral financial aid was made well-nigh impossible, 
because her exports were of inferior quality and high cost. 
Another serious hindrance to the improvement of Libya's 
economy arose from the lack of credit and banking facili-
ties, caused by the closure of all Italian financial houses 
after the defeat of the Italian forces in 1943. Because 
of the deficit in the country's balance of trade, resulting 
from the cessation of subsidies by the Italian government, 
the Administrative Powers had granted more than 4,750,000 
dollars annually in excess of the occupational costs. 
These grants-in-aid were barely enough for Libya to main-
tain its economic life on a subsistence level with very 
limited rehabilitation and development work. It was ob-
vious that substantial outside assistance would be required 
to maintain even the existing poor standards, and even 
greater amounts for development in the economic and social 
fields. It was clear, therefore, that: 
Unless means are found to improve the agricultural 
techniques of the country and to bring in new capital 
investment, there is a grave danger that the Libyan 
economy will sink back toward a pastoral economy of 
nomadism, with inevitable social and political con-
sequences which ~y jeopardize the very existence 
of the new State. 
Soon after arriving, the Commissioner studied the 
possibilities of acquiring aid through the United Nations 
and the Specialized Agencies. He found, however, that be-
fore being able to secure practical aid for Libya, a series 
of thorough and far-reaching. surveys would have to be made 
of the conditions in the country. These would cover the 
immediate and long-term needs of Libya, correlated with 
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the probable economic, financial and personnel resources 
of the country. In the spring of 1950, the Commissioner 
suggested to the governments of France and the United King-
dom that, as Administrative Powers, they request the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations to make available, under 
the UN Technical Assistance Programme, the services of a 
technical assistance expert to being the initial planning 
and, subsequently, to act as co-ordinator of a technical 
assistance programme in Libya. The United Kingdom wished 
to apply for a full-scale survey team, but as such a step 
could not be taken until funds were made available, the 
implementation of this proposal had to be postponed. 
The needs of Libya, however, could not afford to wait. 
The Secretary General, at the request of the Commissioner 
and acting under the auspices of paragraph nine of the reso-
lution of the General Assembly (Appendix B), made funds 
available for the immediate recruitment of technical ad-
visors, including experts in the fields of agriculture, 
currency, banking, administration and organization, and land 
tenure. At the same time, the Secretary General sent to 
Libya a small technical assistance survey team under the 
leadership of Professor Carter Goodrich of Columbia Univer-
sity. The team, after making a tour of the three regions of 
II 11 Libya, compiled a short balance-sheet of the country show-
ing its assets and debits in terms of material resources, 
manpower, education, financial situation and technical 
know-how . It is this small survey which has been the basis 
for all subsequent technical assistance reports and studies 
for all development programmes aimed at building up the social 
and economic life of the country. 
In addition to these steps taken by the Secretary 
General to furnish a team of experts, the Commissioner 
requested a UNESCO and WHO to send representatives to Libya. 
As a result, a draft programme o~ assistance by the UN 
and the Specialized Agencies was formulated to develop a 
competent Libyan civil service through education and training 
in public administration. A representative o~ WHO, after 
studying the health conditions of the country reported 
that the primary problems in his field were a lack of tech-
nical education and of competent medical personnel • . 
In making h~ report to ECOSOC at its eleventh session 
i n August, 1950, the Commissioner requested this body to 
make special provision for continuation of a technical 
assistance programme for Libya during the period of time 
between independence and the time that Libya would become 
a member of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies: 
He Lfhe Commissionei7 pointed out that, unless such 
special provision were made, United Nations technical 
assistance to Libya would lapse immediately upon its 
attainment of independence. Thus, Libya would in ef-
fect be penalized for attaining the early independen~e 
envisaged by the resolution of the General Assembly. 
Upon this suggestion, ECOSOC passed a resolution requesting 
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the Secretary General to consider the special needs of 
Libya in the matter of technical assistance and to present 
at the next session of the General Assembly a proposal 
which would insure technical assistance to Libya after 
its independence and before it became a member of the United 
Nations. 
The preparatory mission under Professor Goodrich re-
commended in their program report of technical assistance 
II to Libya that the first step should be a ~eneral Economic 
It Appraisal of the economic position and potentialities 
of the country . . As a result of the report of the prepara-
tory mission~ the British and French governments, as Ad-
ministering Powers in the territories concerned, requested 
technical assistance from the United Nations and the Special-
ized Agencies; a team of experts~ headed by Mr. John Lind-
berg~ began to arrive in January, 1951. The resulting 
report, which was transmitted to the Director General of 
the Technical Assistance Administration by the Chief Econo-
mist in September~ 1951, can be divided into two main parts. 
The first describes the national resources~ the people and 
the economic conditions of the country~ much the same ground 
as was covered in Chapter II of this thesis. The second 
and concluding part appraises~ on the basis of the above 
findings, the economic position and potentialities of the 
country~ pointing out the conditions necessary for economic 
development and the direction in which this goal is to be 
pursued. It is this section of the report that is particu-
larly pertinent, for it constitutes the framework on which 
subsequent missions have acted and within which the economic 
and social development of Libya has taken place. 
This second section of ~he report is introduced by 
a short chapter on the theory and inherent meaning of eco-
nomic development. Economic development is the relation-
ship between two factors, national income and population. 
To be more precise, economic development occurs when the 
rate of growth of national income is higher than that of the 
population. Taking this postulate as a starting point, the 
author goes on to state that the potential population in-
crease of Libya is 2 to 3 per cent per annum.3 If we con-
11 f1 
sider the fact that Libya is a backward country of Mo-
hammedan religion, it becomes quite evident that any policy 
of birth control would be impossible at the present time. 
With the rate of population increase as a constant factor, 
it is obvious that the variable in this case must be the 
national income. The problem, then, in its most concise 
and yet most embracing form, is to consider circumstances 
which determine the growth of national income. The diffi-
culty, however, is that this depends on a number of con-
tinuously modifying factors which must constantly be taken 
into consideration and subsequently met. These altering 
conditions, as listed by Mr. Lindberg in his report, in-
clude the supply and character of natural resources, the 
skill and industry of the population, the organization 
of the country's administration, methods of production, 
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the nature of its trading relations with the rest of the 
world~ and, finally, the amount of savings available for 
investment.4 National income in any country is generally 
diverted into three main streams: administrative expendi-
ture; savings; and popular consumption. The three must be 
distributed in such proportions as - tc · ,guarantee the maximum 
increase of income. In the case of Libya, Mr. Lindberg 
finds that priority should be given to those projects which 
directly increase productivity and hence consumption, while 
administrative expenditures should be kept as low as is 
compatible with ll effective administration. "5 Savings should 
be aimed as high as is consistent with the other ends men-
tioned above. 
The final chapter of this report is entitled Directions 
of Econoinic Deveiopment and sets down in very general terms 
a broad framework within which both long and short-term 
plans may be formulated. It points out that the general 
direction of a country's progress is largely determined 
by its natural resourees3 the character of its people and 
the extent of its capital resources. It has already been 
noted that the overwhelming majority of the population of 
Libya is unskilled and illiterate, their domestic savings 
are negligible and the supply of raw materials and sources 
of energy are woefUlly inadequate. The appreciable natural 
resources that the country possesses can be exploited only 
through pastoralism. For a long time, the natural line 
of economic development will have to be in agriculture and 
an1rual husbandry. Although Libya is predominantly agri-
cultural, it does not raise enough to adequately feed its 
population. Economic development , therefore, should stim-
ulate the raising of enough food for domestic needs with 
a view toward the later creation of an export-surplus to 
pay for the import of industrial products. 
Cereals are Libya's most important product constituting 
the mainstay of the people's diet and, as an export, the 
main source of foreign currency. It is obvious, therefore, 
that cereal production should be greatly increased, primar-
ily by extending cultivated areas and increasing the yield 
per acre through more efficient methods of tillage, weed-
control and the introduction of better strains of wheat 
and barley. Another potential agricultural product is 
treecrops, which are admirably suited to the climatic con-
ditions of Libya. The most important and traditional of 
these is the olive tree, the cultivation of which was greatly 
extended by the Italians. Most authorities working in 
Libya recommend increased new plantings of olives. They 
pointed out, however, that the technical difficulties and 
capital investments involved would be less detrimental to 
success than the Libyan farmer's lack of confidence in 
the future, which tends to make him ignore a tree which 
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will produce no returns ~or fi~een years. Citrus ~ruits, 
according to the report, could prove to be a great poten-
tial export i~ a way could be found to solve the transporta-
tion and marketing problems. The same could be applied to 
vegetables, which could be exported to Europe during the 
early winter months, as they ripen approximately one month 
earlier than those of competing areas. 6 
In view o~ the ~act that the people of Libya show 
natural aptitude ~or pastoral pursuits and that the arid 
land is ideal ~or grazing purposes, livestock production 
could be increased considerably with the introduction o~ 
selective animal breeding, the organization of marketing, 
the grading o~ wool and the institution of cold storage 
facilities. 
Owing to the general agricultural character of the 
country, industrial growth is bound to remain comparatively 
limited, although there is some room for the development 
' o~ local industries to process agricultural and fishing 
products. 
In summary, then, the report shows that the key to 
development lies in increasing agricultural productivity 
and solving the questions of processing, marketing· and 
distribution. Because o~ the nature of the people, pros-
perity is likely to result more from many small projects 
than a few large ones. But behind all this lies a grave 
need for considerable progress in education at all levels 
and in all areas. Though the cost of adequate education 
may run high , it is considered essential to any plan for 
lasting economic development. 
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Following the general survey phase in the preparation 
of a plan for the economic and social development of Libya, 
the second phase was introduced in July, 1951, by sending 
.. 
a team of twenty-one experts to Libya under the Expanded 
Technical Assistance Programme of the United Nations. 
This team was entrusted with the specific task of making 
a survey and preparing a report which would provide a con-
cise anddetailed framework within which the further de-
velopment of Libya could take place. The Social and Eco-
nomic Development of Libya differs from preceding reports 
in that it has used the former surveys as well as larger 
quantities of newly-acquired material to form a basis of 
knowledge and information. In addition to this, the report 
under consideration is the main work used by subsequent 
technical assistance missions in their practical develop-
ment of Libya. 
As a blueprint for the social and economic development 
of Libya, this report describes the process in three ways: 
1. By recommending, and justifying by analysis, 
an institutional framework for the further planning 
and implementation of economic and social developments 
of Libya. 
2. By recommending, and justifying by analysis, . 
an integrated short-run (six-year) programme of economic 
and social development expenditures, indicating priorities 
and suggesting an allocation of funds among specific 
projects and programmes, some described in general 
terms, and some defined in greater detail. 
3. By analyzing certain long-run problems, and 
laying do~ a few principles to guide longer-run 
planning. 
Before entering the body prope~ of the report, the 
, 
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Chief Economist and Co-ordinator spends some time analyzing 
the special conditions found in Libya under which · subse-
quent development prejects must take place. These conditions 
are the basic facets of Libya's personality; as a group 
they form a background that is unique to that country. The 
first of these is the problem of unification. In Libya, 
the term II 11 population has special meaning. As was explained 
in Chapter II, the three provinces have never been tradi-
tionally united. Within each province there are geographical 
subdivisions with sharply differing geological and climatic 
conditions that lead to widely disparate potentials for 
economic development. In addition, there are sharp social 
and religious as well as racial and linguistic differences. 
Any proposed plan, therefore, must take into consideration 
an unequal rate of probably development. 
Economic independence is further complicated by the fact 
that the country has an economy that has been described 
as deficitary. 8 Libya operates under such a deficit that 
it does not produce enough to maintain even its present 
low standard of living. It will only be able to alleviate 
42 
this condition through a long period of financial assistance 
from other countries. This means that the financing states 
will probably demand some voice in deciding how these funds 
are utilized. The plan must take this possibility into 
consideration as well as make provisions for future Libyan 
independence from foreign aid. The total view of the Libyan 
economy shows it to be a deficitary one, which further im-
plies that criteria other than those normally applied to 
situations of under-development would prove inadequate, 
even damaging, in Libya's case. In other words, certain 
projects must be included in the plan even if they do not 
cover their costs in the long run.9 
Another problem is that of extremely limited resources. 
Libya not only lacks developed industries, but it also has 
no resources for industrial development, such as water-
power, coal, petroleum and minerals. This would lead one 
to believe that the country is primarily agricultural, 
which is quite true. Yet here too, it is impoverished, 
having no rich grazing lands, fertile soils or abundant 
rainfall. 
The problem of manpower is acute and most serious. 
It is not only a question of insufficiency, but also one 
of inadequate skills and low productivity. Nearly 90 per 
cent of the· labour force is engaged in primitive agricul-
ture, while only 6 per cent work in industry and crafts 
and 3 per cent in public and private administration.lO 
Except for a few wealthy families, the accumulated capital 
of the Arab population consists of livestock, tools and 
housing. Capital in the monetary sense is practically non-
existent in the bulk of the population. Libyan capacity 
to finance its own economic development is, therefore, 
strictly limited, and most capital must be provided through 
foreign loans of various types. 
Of the total development budget suggested in the re-
port (Table II), only half was allotted to investment pro-
jects; the remainder was to be diverted into such non-
accumulative items as school-buildings, agricultural and 
industrial equipment, agricultural research, experiment and 
demonstration, and reparation of public facilities damaged 
by war. Although these expenditures would raise Libyan 
productivity in the long run, they could not be considered 
net capital accumulation in the usual sense. Somehow, ad-
ditional fUnds would have to be found if the deterioration 
of Libyan productivity was to be halted. But even if capi-
tal accumulation became possible, per capita income would 
not rise if the population increase rate were to follow a 
steeper accelerating curve than that of capital accumula-
tion. In 1952, the Libyan birth-rate was 5.3 per cent and 
the death-rate 4.2 per cent. 11 The death-rate, however, 
at that time consisted largely of a very high infant mor-
tality. Social and economic development of the country, 
with its accompanying benefits would mean a sharp and 
obvious drop in infant mortality, thus accelerating the 
population rise even more, in proportion to deaths. 
As a result of the paucity of capital, skilled labor 
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and natural resources, the planners were faced with the 
problem of the scale of the projects. All projects requiring 
extensive investment in plants, equipment and manpower 
were automatically precluded, and the areas chosen for de-
velopment had to be densely populated and already produc-
tive to some degree. 
In addition, there was the problem of incentive. 
There had been little reason, historically speaking, for 
the Libyans to expend much effort in work and savings. 
Any benefits that the population derived from projects 
undertaken by the colonial powers were indirect and often 
accidental. It would take them some time to rid themselves 
of their prejudices and to realise that only they could 
help themselves in the final analysis. Connected with 
the above are the problems arising from the existence of 
certain important social institutions and customs. One 
of these was the nomadism and semi-nomadism practiced by 
40 per cent of the population. Another is the closely 
related institution of tribes. There would undoubtedly 
be friction caused by inconsistency between tribal organi-
zations and national, or even provincial economic planning. 
It is obvious that the existence of these social attitudes 
and customs would have to be taken into consideration if 
the development plan was to be a success and the Libyans 
not be antagonized by Western methods. 
The main part of the report, Economic and Social De-
velopment of Libya, is made up of a number of sections, 
each dealing with a particular phase of the social and 
economic life of the country. Each section is subdivided 
into two main chapters, the first describing the existing 
conditions and factors. These chapters are heavily docu-
mented by figures and charts. The second enumerates in 
minute detail the proposed recommendations for plans and 
programmes all aimed toward a general increase in the wel-
fare of the country. To analyze this part of the plan in 
detail would be impossible, not only because of its extreme 
length and detail, but also because it exceeds the boundaries 
of this thesis. A more extensive analysis will be given 
of the role that FAO plays within this framework in Chapter 
IV; as such it will encompass a thorough analysis of the 
agricultural conditions and recommendations mentioned in 
this report, thereby integrating the preceding chapters 
on FAO and Libya. In order to acquire a clear view of 
the scope and nature of the technical assistance rendered 
to Libya, however, it is necessary to give an over-all 
picture of what the report entails. 
Economic development, in the Western sense of the 
concept, means an all-embracing trend toward industriali-
zation with emphasis on the growth of manufacturing, 
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marketing of industrialized products, trade, commerce 
and transportation. Through necessity and by definition, 
this bas also meant a sharp decline in the relative impor-
tance of agriculture, or at least has relegated it to a 
position where it forms a complement to industry. In Libya , 
however, the proposed plan for economic development puts 
the emphasis , again through necessity, on agriculture and 
relegates industrialization to a long-term and still nebu-
lous plan. 
Considering the plan as a whole, there are two features 
in the Libyan scene that influence the nature of the inten-
tions. The first is a fact mentioned previously --namely 
that the country has no known natural resources that are 
untapped or unexploited, with the possible exception of 
underground ~ater in certain .limited areas. Secondly, 
the Italian occupation resulted in large-scale developments 
in the form of public utilities, civic buildings and trans-
portation facilities. Many of these were damaged during the 
war, ·and although some of these developments tend to be 
too advanced for the present state of the country's develop-
ment, they were considered to be a future necessity as the 
country progressed. Thus, maintenance, repair and restora-
tion of these utilities tend to take what might be considered 
a disproportionately large percentage of the economic budget. 
The basic purpose of the recommendations made, not 
only by this team of UN experts, but by all other technicians 
employed by the technical assistance missions to Libya, 
was to raise the general productivity of the country so as 
to ensure a higher standard of living and at least the 
minimal degree of economic independe~ce necessary to main-
tain the country's political autonomy in the world. The 
task of knowing where to start working toward this goal 
seemed almost impossible considering the country's complete 
lack of capital. The picture, however, on closer anal-
ysis, shows one optimistic factor. For Libya has one major 
untapped resource -- the latent skill of the people. Taking 
this fact as a beginning, it becomes evident that the first 
task to be accomplished by the government and technical 
assistance aid is to raise the productivity of the country 
by teaching the people to do better than the~ already are. 
In other words, taking into account and accepting as a 
basis for a blueprint the existing methods of agricultural 
production, these techniques and methods must be improved 
upon so as to raise the general output of products. As 
this can only be achieved through education, the first 
short-term plans in the report are those concerned with 
educational training in agriculture, light industry and 
handicrafts. This type of technical education, however, 
requires a solid background in general education, which, at 
the time of the report, was definitely lacking in Libya. 12 
The proposals for an educational programme were di-
vided into four main subheadings. The first of these was 
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a proposal for a formal school system. The primary re-
quirement here was to increase and improve the quality of 
Libyan teachers. For this purpose, .the women 1 s and men's 
teachers training centres in both Benghazi and Tripoli had 
to be improved by adding books, equipment and funds for 
enlarging the staffs and student bodies. The second, 
agricultural training, could be best accomplished through 
the introduction of an agricultural bias in elementary and 
secondary schools and the establishment and improvement of 
already existing training centres. The training of agri-
cultural technicians at the university level was· to be 
accomplished through the extension of foreign fellowships by 
FAO. The third was vocational and technical training. 
Trade schools already existed in Tripoli and Benghazi, but 
these required improvement and enlargement . As in the 
case of agricultural education, the training of engineers 
would be done with the help of fellowships abroad. 
The fourth of these, adult education in the field 
of agriculture, formed the core of the short-term plan 
for improving productivity. Experiments, demonstrations 
and extension works were all to be carried out by the es-
tablishment of an Agriculture and Forestry Agency set up 
as a result of an agreement between FAO and the Libyan 
government. This agency would not only occupy itself with 
the above-mentioned programmes, but would also fost.er such 
projects as reafforestation , range improvement, investigation 
and agricultural credit. 
AS.ide !'rom the Agency, l3 there would be certain ''act ion" 
projects,14 of which the most important would be the plant-
ing of olive trees and almond trees, and the import of pure 
seeds, agricultural tools, and live-stock for crossbreeding. 
Most of these projects were to be carried out by local 
labor under the supervision of technical assistance experts. 
Although most of the increased output in agricultural 
goods would be diverted into domestic consumption, especial-
ly during the first years of the plan, some would have to 
be utilized for . the express purpose of export to improve 
the country's balance of trade. One of the complementary 
programmes within the agricultural plan was to locate mar-
kets and improve the methods of handling, transporting and 
marketing goods. Fruit and vegetables were to be graded 
more carefully and a project was to be instituted in order 
to eliminate the Mediterranean fruit fly. Wool, which is one 
of Libya's main exports, would find more profitable markets 
if methods of shearing, baling, scouring and sorting were 
improved. 
Although untapped underground water resources are 
found only in restricted areas, more and better wells could 
be sunk in these regions, and many of the old-fashioned 
artesian types could be replaced by electric pumps, thereby 
increasing the water output and the extent of irrigable 
land. 
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In the field of public transport and utilities, the 
plan advising the reparation of existing war damaged facili-
ties rather than undertaking the construction of new pr9-
jects, which would necessitate a capital outlay dispropor-
tionate to the existing capital wealth of the country. 
Such items, therefore, as the harbor facilities at Ben-
ghazi and Tripoli, highways, municipal water supply and 
sewerage systems would be rebuilt and, where feasible, 
modernized. One of the most important of these facilities 
is the power plant at Tripoli, for it serves not only the 
city with electric power, but also all the farms and ir-
rigation wells in the outlying districts. ·At the time the 
report was written, the of'ficials. in charge of the plant 
stated that, with maintenance and the installation of a 
-
new furnace and turbine, it could operate for another two 
years, despite its age and condition. The report suggests, 
however , that the Libyan · government ask the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to survey the pro-
spects for a new power plant. 
It has by now becom~ evident that, in view of Libyars 
lack of mineral resources, capital and power, there is 
little hope for any significant expansion of Libyan com-
merce and industry, at least during the first phase of 
development. A number of small industries were· found to be 
ameliorable with only a small capital outlay. These, handi-
crafts and the fishing, sponge diving and tanning industries, 
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could be much improved by the use or experts and instructors 
in each rield. The tourist trade, a potentially powerfUl 
source or revenue because or the excellent beaches and 
ancient ruins existing in Libya, could be bettered _by mod-
ernizing and repairing the existing hotels. However, the 
report shows that the processing of its own materials con-
tains Libya's greatest hope for industrialization. Such 
light industries as freezing vegetables and rruit, packing 
meat and fish, and refining oil would only require training 
in modern processing techniques. 
The budget, as envisaged by the report, would appor-
tion only a small amount for the introduction of large 
projects in the field of public assistance and social de-
velopment. These are not yet on the priority list, as they 
do not directly result in higher national productivity, 
the basic aim of the development programme during the first 
two years. The budget does, however, make allowance for 
modest slum clearance programmes and public housing pro-
jects, and advises that a long-range plan be seriously con-
sidered for raising the country's standard of nutrition. 
The budget for the economic and social development 
of Libya was to total b2,300,000 in the years 1952-53· 
Of the total, ~200,000 would be furnished by the United 
Nations and Specialized Agencies, the remaining hl,~OO,OOO 
to be financed by the Libyan Development and Stabilization 
Agency and the L-ibyan Finance Corporation •15 
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Although the proposed budget for the plan seems hope-
lessly inadequate for the country's needs, it has been 
distributed with such care as to insure a rapid increase 
in per capita productivity and show tangible results in 
a short period of time. This is particularly important 
from the psychological point of view. The basic aim of 
technical assistance to help people to help themselves 
can best be achieved in Libya if the people can be given 
a definite incentive with which to go on working in and for 
the future. 
Implementation of the plan described would require 
a large, competent staff of administrators. The existing 
Libyan civil servants were neither numerous nor expert 
enough to deal with a development plan of this magnitude, 
nor were the country's finances sufficient to hire the 
necessary experts from abroad. Consequently, the planners 
recommended that all experts and administrators be fur-
nished by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies 
under the Technical Assistance Programme. 
A Resident Technical Assistance Representative was 
provided for under one of the agreements between the Libyan 
government, the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. 
As personal representative of the Secretary General, he was 
to assume the duties of co-ordinator among the various 
teams of experts working in the field, assist the Libyan 
government in preparing their requests for technical 
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assistance and be available in an advisory capacity. In 
view of the tremendous amount of responsibility delegated to 
the Resident Representative, the report suggests that he be 
provided with a Deputy with the power of Chief Economist. 
The Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency 
was the organ in charge of implementing the plans as pro-
posed by the team of technical assistance experts. It 
was established in December, 1951, 16 primarily as a plan-
ning and financing agency, and receives through the Libyan 
government fUnds made available by foreign countries for 
the specific purpose of social and economic development. 
It is also responsible for insuring and re-enforcing Libya!s 
economic stability. In preparation for such contingency, 
the agency is required to build up a Stabilization Fund of 
bl,OOO,OOO in order to secure food reserves and give neces-
sary assistance in times of drought or economic depression. 
The Libyan Finance Corporation, also established in 
December, 1951, 17 was conceived to finance other credit 
organizations; its bl,OOO,OOO capital is subscribed to by 
foreign governments. The Corporation is not primarily 
a profit-making organization in that it grants loans at 
an extremely low rate of interest and on such non-restric-
tive terms as are indicated by the economic and social 
conditions of the country. 
This chapter has discussed, at some length, the ap-
proaches and methods by which a technical assistance 
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programme of some magnitude, one that covers the entire 
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CHAPTER N 
AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 
In Libya, the development of agricultural products 
is of primary importance; because of this, the present 
chapter will discuss in detail the proposals and projects 
that have been made in the field of agriculture and ani-
mal husbandry by the plan. It was discovered by the tech-
nical experts that, with the limited budget available to 
the country for economic development, it would be more 
profitable to develop those fields of agriculture and ani-
mal husbandry already significant in foreign and domestic 
trade, rather than initiate any new areas of development. 
It would be well at this point, therefore, to summar-
ize briefly the existing exportable products of th~ country 
and their potentialities for expansion. The most impor-
tant trade in livestock is the export of sheep to Greece 
and Egypt. In normal years this trade is run with not 
more than the usual commercial risks. In years of heavy 
drought, however, the price of sheep per head tends to 
l drop about 300 per cent, thereby making any profit accrued 
in the past years negligible. Wool, of which about half 
is exported and half used in small local industries, comes 
from the fat-tailed Barbary sheep, which, though well 
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adapted to the dry climate, produce wool of low-grade type 
and colour. Goats are Lmportant domestically as a source 
of milk, hair, hides and meat, and are well-suited to the 
drought-ridden climate except that they tend to demolish 
large areas of land by grazing and biting the shoots so 
short that they cannot regenerate. Camels, again well 
suited to the climate, are ideal draught animals for about 
twenty years; after their usefulness is past, they are 
slaughtered for meat, hide and hair. 
Barley is the most important product of Libyan agri-
culture and could be a potentially rich source of income. 
However, it also forms the major part of the country's 
daily diet and, as the annual harvest is dependent on un-
certain rainfall, it would be necessary to build a large 
reserve before export can be envisaged. 
Olives and olive oil represent one of the country's 
most hopeful investments, as the three-and-a-half million 
trees planted during the Italian administration are due 
to mature within the next five years. 2 In 1951, there 
existed only one olive oil refinery in Tripolitania while 
another was being prepared for the future. Almonds, whose 
trees require five years to mature, are another potential 
investment, although the high cost of transportation pre-
cludes the north European markets. Citrus fruits, a very 
exportable product during the winter months, are usually 
of good quality, but could be improved with better methods 
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of pruning, fertilizing and irrigation. Dates, like bar-
ley, form a large part of the domestic diet, and here again 
large reserves would have to be built before export could 
be attempted. Also, the marketing of dates would have to 
be greatly improved before export could be encouraged. 
Wheat, which is grown mainly in the Fezzan, could gain both 
in quality and quantity with better seed selection and 
planting techniques. Other fruits and vegetables, such 
as tomatoes, grapes, plums and others, are grown solely 
for domestic consumption and are, on the whole, of very 
inferior quality. 
All the commodities mentioned above form a broad and 
solid basis for the expansion of agriculture to raise the 
standard of living and reduce the country's import surplus. 
A development programme, if it has to have far-reaching 
effects, requires not only projects that are directly con-
cerned with agricultural increase, but also an administra-
tive and financial organization to direct and implement 
the projects, and markets in which the increase can be 
directed. 
Improvement of agriculture in Libya, if the country 
is to remain democratic and if the standard of living is 
to affect the whole population, cannot be achieved through 
the use of dictatorial or authoritarian methods. The only 
way to achieve the goal is through persuasion, inducement 
and evident advantage. As has been pointed out before, 
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the main problem is the lack of trained and experienced 
personnel, so that imported experts would have to be used, 
at least during the initial phases of the programmes, being 
replaced as more Libyans attained the technical knowledge 
necessary to run the projects. Most of the projects were 
to be carried out by independent or semi-governmental 
agencies, which, being non-political in nature, would be 
ideal for accepting assistance from the UN, LATAs, Spec-
ialized Agencies and private foundations. 
Agricultural research being of primary importance, 
the report suggests that an Agricultural Research Insti-
tute be established. It would have its headquarters in 
Tripolitania with various branches and sub-departments in 
Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, and stations located throughout 
the three provinces. Some of the projects suggested by 
the plan were: cereal seed selection and multiplication; 
range regeneration; irrigation water requirements; tree 
crop variety and pruning trials; fertilization and culti-
vation methods; livestock breeding experiments; conserving 
and processing of fruits and vegetables; and plant disease 
control exper1mentation.3 Complementing these projects in 
experimentation, the institute would also be responsible 
for demonstration programmes exhibiting improved and more 
modern methods of cultivation, animal husbandry and farming 
to farmers and tribesmen. 
As the development of Libya progressed, the experts 
realized that some national organization should be esta-
blished which would take over the investigation and plan-
ning of future projects, and extens.ions of present ones, 
from the technical assistance experts furnished by the 
UN and the Specialized Agencies. Such projects would in-
elude investigating possible surface water storage, de-
lineating underwater resources, outlining areas suitable 
for specific types of land use and surveying foreign mar-
kets for Libyan goods. The organization would work in 
close cooperation with and submit its plans for approval 
to the Economic Planning Committee, the Libyan Finance 
Corporation and the Libyan Public Development and Stabi-
lization Agency. 
In the field of range management and improvement, 
a great deal of organization would be required, due to 
the fact that the old customs and traditions prevailing 
in the country, particularly the idea of regarding land 
as free and a gift from Allah, are beliefs that can only 
be changed slowly and must be dealt with carefully. The 
work would have to be carried out on a purely local :evel 
and coordinated with the local governments and tribes, 
requiring a large amount of convincing demonstration to 
show rapid result in improvement. In the beginning a few 
of the more progressive tribes could be found, with whom 
it would be possible to make an agreement whereby the or-
ganization would provide assistance in return for 
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permission to use the range. 
As has been explained in the previous chapter, the 
need for extended credit on easy terms is one of the pri-
mary requisites of an agricultural society, particularly 
credit extension to small farmers, who collectively can 
best increase the country's productivity and standard or 
living. This service could not be extended solely by the 
Finance Corporation, so a semi-governmental agency was 
planned to supplement the credit extended by existing 
commercial banks. Owing, however, to the comparative 
ignorance of the farmers receiving such aid, the organi-
zation would have to be supervisory as well as financial, 
taking care that the money lent by it would be used for 
projects ultimately leading to higher productivity. Such 
an agency would take some time to set up; therefore, the 
plan proposes a temporary programme based on three kinds 
62 
of loan. Commercial banks would be encouraged to extend 
loans of longer than one year to large farmers, while the 
small farmers would be extended loans of material and equip-
ment, particularly seeds. In addition to this, animals, 
tools and small equipment would be sold to the farmers 
on easy time payment plans, the goods themselves to be 
used as security. 
The organization of the agencies required to imple-
ment the above-mentioned programmes and projects represen-
ted a certain amount of difficulty. Dr. 0. J. Wheatley, 
Chief Agriculturist of the team of experts, suggested that 
two separate but coordinated agencies be established. 
One, an agricultural institute, would combine the research 
institute and the projects investigation service. This 
would combine into one organization those projects which 
are mainly experimental and scientific in character, which 
would require the assistance of imported technical experts 
for a long period to come, and which would divert little 
local labour and administration. Such projects as range 
improvement and financial settlement assistance, which are 
essentially field jobs requiring a large amount of local 
labour and especially administration and which could soon 
be taken over by the Libyans themselves, would be combined 
4 into a second agency. After a certain amount of delibera-
tion among the members of the team, it was felt that the 
ease and simplicity of a single agricult-ural agency would 
more than outweigh the advantages of separating the scien-
tific aspects from the applied field work. 
As a result of this latter view, an Agreement was 
signed between FAO and the Libyan Government in 1951, 
establishing a single Agriculture and Forestry Agency, 
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which was to be an auxiliary unit of the Libyan Ministry 
of Finance and Economic, taking its direction from the 
n5 Ministry. The Agency was headed by a Director support-
ed by an Agricultural Economist in charge of programme 
planning and analysis and of fUture studies on the 
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possibility of extended programmes. It was divided into 
five sections: a Research I~stitute, the head of which would 
also act as Deputy Director of the Agency; an Agricultu-
ral Production Section; a Credit, Cooperatives and Market-
ing Section; a Forestry Section; and an Agricultural Sta-
tistics Section.6 As specified in the Agreement, the in-
itial personnel of the Agency consisted of imported experts 
in the various fields handled by the Agency with the under-
standing that, as more Libyans became competent technicians~ 
they would be replaced~ until the time would come when a 
Federal Department of Agriculture would be set up. Then 
the Agency would become completely responsible to the 
Federal Department. During the six months following the 
signing of the Agreement, the Agency was in the progress 
of being established and staffed. During this period~ too, 
the Libyan-American Technical Assistance Service (LATAS) 
was organizing its agricultural programme in close coop-
eration with the UN and FAO. All major projects and pro-
grammes under discussion and planning at this time were 
not only the first major practical implementations and the 
results of the many experts in the previous years, but 
also proved to be those projects that were to remain pre-
dominantly unchanged throughout the next few years of de-
velopment. 
It is obvious that not all projects could be attacked 
at the same time. This would have required too much 
money, too many experts and too much time in a country 
where rapid returns were mandatory. A certain system of 
classification, therefore, was introduced, whereby projects 
were graded in priority. Among the most important of these 
~res the increase of cereal production and tree crops through 
seed improvement. Judging from past experiences in other 
countries, the returns on this kind of project would be 
highest relative to the cost of all action projects. This 
goal would be attained by the Agency setting up pure seed 
multiplication farms, during the first year importing the 
pure strains, but subsequently using the produced seeds 
for distribution to farmers. The amelioration of tree crops 
was another project that is highly attractive due to a 
resulting definite increased productivity. The only draw-
back in this field of endeavor, however, was its long-term 
character in that the trees most suitable to the Libyan 
climate (dates, olives and citrus fruits) take a con-
siderable time to mature. In order to counter-attack this 
disadvantage, the Agency was to expand the existing nurse-
ries in order to make trees immediately available to in-
dividual farmers and collective ventures. The trees could 
also be used as an incentive by giving them away as prizes 
for individual efforts in preparation for planting by farm-
ers. During the first year, the trees would have to be 
imported in order to start the project. Reafforestation, 
so necessary in a country where the desert is for·ever 
threatening encroachment on farmland, could be started 
on a small scale during periods of unemployment due to 
drought. 
66 
Although apparently insignificant, a project of small 
tool development would mean a tremendous change in the 
agricultural productivity of Libya. The introduction of 
many simple, animal-drawn implements and the replacement 
of sickles by scythes, for example, means much more to 
an agriculturally backward country like Libya than a few 
tractors and threshers. In order to develop this project, 
technical guidance and financial assistance would be given 
to the small tools manufacturers. This Agency would act 
as middleman in selling the tools to the farmers on a time 
payment plan. 
It was found that there was a great lack of animal 
livestock, particularly mules for the small farmers. It 
was also found, however, that if a large programme in this 
field were to be introduced, it would be necessary to im-
port the stock from abroad. Otherwise, the price of the 
scarce, locally-owned stock would rise to such heights 
that it would practically nullify any advantages that 
might be gained from this particular programme. The 
Research Institute would operate with the local agricul-
tural departments on the technical side, to implement a 
programme of livestock disease control. 
The above projects have been listed in the degree of 
priority with which they were to be dealt with. This 
does not mean, however, that they were implemented con-
secutively, but rather that they would be attempted simul-
taneously. If, however, it proved that due to lack of re-
sources, experts , or other difficulties this procedure 
was impossible, certain projects like cereal seed improve-
ment would be carried out whatever happened. 
There were a certain number of projects which were 
envisaged in great detail but reserved for later implement-
ation. These fall into ~hree categories: those programmes 
requiring more detailed planning and investigation; those 
requiring small-scale trials first to test their efficacy; 
and those requiring co-operative agreements between the 
agency carrying out the programme and the beneficiary. 
Some examples of these are large-scale range re-seeding, 
tree planting programmes and large-scale surface water 
storage. It was also suggested that LATAS be the organiza-
tion to make a water survey of the area, determine the 
possibility of wells and draw up designs for such wells 
and cisterns. The actual construction of the wells would 
be carried out by labour hired by the Agency and upon their 
completion, maintenance and prevention of the deterioration 
of surrounding range lands would be the responsibility of 
the local users.7 
Drought periods being of a serious nature in Libya, 
especially their effect on the low-income groups, it was 
found extremely necessary to find projects so as to pro-
vide relief that was not at the same t~e charity. Many 
of the projects described earlier in this chapter eould 
only be carried out in the proper season and during regu-
lar intervals over a period of years. For these two rea-
sons certain flexible projects were planned that could be 
started at any place, at any time, and at little cost. 
Such programmes included the construction of water conser-
vation works as well as hill-side terracing. To prevent 
soil erosion, extensive sand-dune fixing employing cross-
hatch wind fences and wind-breaking planting plans were 
8 proposed. In the latter case the Agency would furnish 
the plants and introduce the projects with educational 
and demonstrational examples. 
The report is extremely careful to point out that 
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on the limited budget available to Libya, the highest 
priority would have to be given to the educational, experi-
mental, and demonstrational work of the Research Institute, 
for it is fundamentally only by these methods that the 
Libyans will find the urge and incentive to increase their 
agricultural productivity, thereby improving their chances 
of economic development. 
It must have become evident by now that the aridity 
is the main stumbling block for the development and sta-
bilization of Libyan agricultural economy, and that an 
extensive programme aimed toward the modernization of 
irrigational techniques would greatly benefit the country. 
Although all three preparatory teams of experts included 
experts on underground water resources and irrigation, 
the resulting information was still not adequate enough 
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to put forward the necessary programme. The problem being 
so complex, it would require considerable more study into 
the geographical, geological, hydrological, agricultural 
and economic position of the country. 9 Such questions 
as the probable net expansion of agriculture and how this 
expansion is to be divided into dry-farming, semi-irrigated 
farming and fully-irrigated farming respectively; the na-
ture and composition of the soil; and the quality and quant-
ity of underground water resources must all be fully stud-
ied and answered before the project can even be planned. 
It would, however, be included as one of the major programmes 
to be carried out as soon as funds and information permit. 
The information known in 1952 was adequate enough 
so that a certain number of short-run projects in irriga-
tion could be formulated. The existing wells would be 
improved and strengthened, and water collection ditches 
would be lined with clay and cement to increase surface 
conservation. Artesian wells would be increased, at the 
same time teaching the users the most efficient methods 
of abundant water flow. In certain areas in Tripolitania 
where the table level seemed stable, 10 shallow wells would 
be dug without much expense if done on a communal basis. 
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In connection with this, the equipment used for raising 
water could also be much improved. The method used through-
JJ ull 
out the country is the traditional dalu. The import 
II 1.1 ( ) of Persian wheels i.e., chain-bucket lif'ting devices , 
which would be sold to individual farmers or communal 
groups would be but a small change, but would mean a great 
increase in irrigational production. The approximately 
12 5000 existing electric pumps in Tripolitania, the pr oper-
ty of Italian farmers, were old and worn, but could be 
replaced by providing these farmers with credit on easy 
terms. 
All the above-mentioned projects, although to the 
Western mind not earthshaking in scope, would result in 
a considerable increase in the production of agricultur al 
commodities, both for the domestic and the foreign markets. 
The problem that had to be solved at this point was how 
to find the markets for the increased goods. The situa-
tion was primarily· one of high costs, thereby limiting 
the products to home consumption and imports to Italy, 
where preferential treatment is given to Libyan goods. 
High costs may seem somewhat contradictory to other state-
ments made previously on the low cost of labour, yet the 
high prices were caused by the high irrigation and fert i-
lizer costs and the inefficiency and small size of the 
cultivated areas. Also the presence of a considerable 
Anglo-American population (due to the technical assistance 
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missions and the presence of a large American airforce 
base in the area) tended to keep prices high. Goods co-
ming from the interior of the country had high transporta-
tion costs and often, due to the slowness of transportation 
were bad on arrival at the harbors. The harbors themselves, 
damaged by war, were unsuitable and too shallow for ships 
of adequate tonnage. In addition to this, the physical 
appearance of the exportable goods was too unattractive 
for sale on foreign markets. All standards had to be raised, 
set and controlled by law. For example, the shearing and 
marketing of wool was primitive. Through the simple ex-
pediency of using modern shears and the scouring of wool 
before baling, the quality of this export could be great-
ly improved • 
A start could be made to solve these problems through 
the import of trained technicians having a knowledge of 
qualitative and quantitative control of agricultural goods 
and of foreign markets who would help the Libyans through 
education and demonstration. Coincidental with this, four 
Libyans were sent to Tunisia and Iraq to study the market-
ing of dates of olives and to Spain to study the packing 
and grading of vegetables and citrus fruits. Another two 
Libyans, with a knowledge of English or French, were sent 
to northern Europe to watch whole-sale fruit markets. 
Although these projects would not have the immediate 
result of increasing exports to any great extent, they would 
tend to bring down prices to a more competitive level, 
thereby laying the foundation for future projects, which 
would ultimately result in a levelling of the balance of 
trade. 
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Although basically industrial, the processing of agri-
cultural products still falls within the scope of this 
chapter and deserves some attention. The marketing and 
processing of all the goods produced is a major obstacle 
to be overcome if substantial expansion is to take place. 
The existing industry, which is potentially the sim-
plest to develop, is skin and hide tanning. Although a 
large number of hides are available in Libya, the indus-
try is relatively small. The reason for this, the tanners 
complained, is that hides and skins were or poor quality. 
Yet, improving this phase could easily be accomplished 
by paying flayers on the quality of their products, by 
insisting on pulling instead of cutting skins, thereby 
eliminating damaged skins, by using paint for branding 
instead or burning and by setting some standards for clean-
liness. If this is done, imports of skins would be unneces-
sary and the development of the tanning industry would mean 
increased exports. Most of these projects can be accom-
plished through technical tpaining by giving a number of 
FAO scholarships to European technical training centres 
and importing one expert in tanning and curing for experi-
mentation and demonstration. 
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The major problem in the field of meat, vegetables 
and fruit is one of poor processing techniques. This, 
again, could be solved with the help of experts in the 
field. At the same time, an experimental canning plant 
was suggested, as well as a drying company for fruit, such 
as apricots and grapes. The most expedient method, how-
ever, which would include all processable products, would 
be freezing. Early attention was to be given toward the· 
establishment of a modern freezing plant handling meats, 
fish, vegetables, fruit and fruit juices. 
It is in the fields of processing, packaging and mar-
keting that we see the close inter-relationship between 
the various Specialized Agencies, for these are the areas 
that include the need for experts in economics and inter-
national trade (ILO) and in disease control (WHO). As 
has been shown over and over again in the projects developed, 
whether they be of a purely agricultural nature or in 
allied fields, education is one of the strongest needs. 
It is with the help of UNESCO as well as FAO that these 
educational projects in agriculture can be carried out. 
Most of the projects described above emphasize to 
a large extent the necessity for adult education in agri-
culture, and many of them have used just that as a basis. 
The formal education of the future generation of young 
Libyans, those who will be adult when the country is 
fully immersed in the process of development must not be 
ignored. In a country where the expansion of education 
is a long and slow process, the elementary schools form 
the bulwark of formal training in rural communities. Al-
though academic education can not be ignored, ·it must be 
heavily complemented with agricultural training, so that 
the graduated student is prepared, either for further studies 
or for the understanding of the basis of his future life. 
All general studies must include an agricultural orienta-
tion, which can be accomplished through the use of manuals 
on various subjects in agriculture and animal husbandry and 
prepared by experts on a level understandable to the student. 
This is to be supplemented by action projects, using gar-
den plots where the crops are grown that are most indigenous 
to the area. In this way, the problems of the raising 
and production of such a crop will be constantly with the 
student, familiarizing him completely with the subject. 
This type of education is particularly feasible as it only 
requires teachers with a minimum of training, who would 
be working under the supervision of an expert. 
The scarcity of agriculturally trained personnel was, 
perhaps, the largest stumbling-block faced by the planners 
during the initial phases of development. (This is not 
only true in agriculture, but in all other fields of de-
velopment as well: administrative, health, commerce, so~ial 
welfare and finances.) Although all kinds of personnel 
were needed, the limited budget made it necessary to give 
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priority to three particular types: rural teachers, famil-
iar with agricultural subjects and able to carry out pro-
grammes of rural reconstruction and education; the forma-
tion of a cadre of practical agriculturists with enough 
experience to carry out instructions given by the technical 
assistance experts; and finally fully-trained technicians 
able to take over from the foreign experts when their train-
ing was completed. 
For the first two types of training, two agricultural 
training centres were to be set up, one in Sidi Mesri, 
Tripolitania, and the other in Magdalena, Cyrenaica, pro-
viding at the same time the facility for students from the 
Fezzan. These two sites are most especially suited for 
this kind of training due to the fact that they are loca-
ted in the centre of agricultural areas. In addition to 
this, the provincial Departments of Agriculture of both 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are in these areas; thus the 
centres adjoin existing facilities such as chemical and 
biological laboratories, dairy and livestock barns, poultry 
houses and tree groves, all used for experimentation by 
the Departments. Not only would the training of rural 
teachers include one year of basic agricultural training 
but the centres would provide an intensive in-service pro-
gramme for teachers selected from all territories during 
their vacations. Both these programmes would emphasize 
practical experience and field demonstrations in such 
study areas as agricultural education, crops and soil, 
animal husbandry, and water and soil conservation. 
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The training of practical agriculturists, which by 
definition means increased technical and scientific educa-
tion, would require longer to accomplish, and would include 
such subjects as agronomy, horticulture, agricultural eco-
nomy, engineering, chemistry, surveying, entomology, and 
veterinary science. 13 Here again, considering the limi-
ted time available, it would be advisory to teach all these 
courses as much as possible through practical demonstration 
and experimentation in the field. 
The ultimate and long-run development of Libya 1s agri-
culture is to be carried out by her own technicians, who, 
will, as they emerge, take over the work from the foreign 
experts. For this, fellowships to foreign universities 
and scholarships would be given to Libyans. Certain con-
ditions were to be attached to the distribution of these, 
however. The universities chosen were to be in countries 
where conditions and past economic and social development 
most resemble Libya•s. The scholarships were to be granted 
only to well-screened students of a high academic potential 
who were prepared to accept a contract with the government 
upon completion of their studies. 14 
Individually considered, the projects described in 
this chapter may appear insignificant to a mind trained 
in an industrial civilization. However, both the experts 
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who made the surveys and built the plans on the basis of 
their findings and those (experts and Libyans) required 
to implement them and make a suecess of them were and are 
human. The proposed plans are not imaginary dreams to be 
read and criticized by intellectual minds in ivory towers, 
but are blueprints based on hard facts, aimed at helping 
a country that is notable for its poverty gain its feet 
in the world. Because the projects will influence and 
be carried out by human beings, the planners did their 
best to implement those ideas which would form a solid, 
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CHAPTER V 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN INDEPENDENT LI6YA 
On December 24, 1952, a Basic Agreement and five 
Supplementary Agreements were signed by the Specialized 
Agencies on the one hand and the Libyan Government on 
the other. They provided for the continuation of tech-
nical assistance already in effect and for the appointment 
of a Resident Technical Assistance Representative. 
The basis of technical assistance, as provided by 
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the UN and the Specialized Agencies, differs from bilater-
al assistance in that the former emphasizes the furnishing 
of experts and materials to under-developed countries 
rather than a large amount of ~inancial aid. The projects, 
as recommended by the technical assistance experts, evalu-
ated the total cost to be approximately 2,000,000 dollars, 
and after consultation it was believed that multilateral 
aid could be given to the amount of about 1,500,000 dollars. 
In accordance with this, the Libyan government put in a 
formal request to TAB for experts, technicians, teachers 
and equipment. 1 A letter addressed to ECOSOC in June, 
1953, by the Acting Prime Minister of Libya, complains 
that II The request was implemented progressively, although 
more slowly than we had hoped and, in fact, fell short 
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of the commitments by a considerable amount. And the 
cold fact was that technical assistance from the inter-
national organizations would have to be curtailed unless 
the government was able to pledge additional funds.- As 
it was, the Libyan government had, during the period 
1952-1953, contributed 338,800 dollars for the purchase 
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of raw materials and local labour supply. In 1953-1954 
the Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency 
promised 357,000 dollars, while the normal budget for that 
year planned 90,000 dollars for new projects. In spite of 
the great effort the government made to produce funds, it 
became evident that even those would not be enough to al-
low expansion of the existing projects, let alone initiate 
any new programmes. As a result of these requests, some 
improvement was made in procuring additional technical 
assistance to Libya, although it was felt by many people 
in the UN that Libya had already received a disproportionate 
amount of assistance in relation to other under-developed 
countries in the world. (Table III) 
Financial, as well as technical assistance was fur-
nished much more readily on a bilateral basis. In July 
1953, the Libyan Government signed a twenty-year Treaty 
of Friendship and Alliance with the United Kingdom, pro-
viding the latter country with certain military privileges 
in Libya. In return for this, the United Kingdom contri-
buted 2,800,000 dollars annually toward the development 
o~ Libya as well a 5,720,000 dollars as assistance to the 
national budget. 0~ the development funds, 25 per cent 
was to be used ~or stabilization and drought relief and 
the remaining 75 per cent ~or development.3 Egypt, France 
and Italy also contributed bilateral a~d in the ~or.m of 
funds. The organization which was to funnel and distrib~ 
ute these funds into the various projects was LPDSA, in 
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which all contributing countries have voting power. 
But the major part o~ bilateral, technical and ~inan­
cial aid came ~rom the United States under Point Four. 
In January 1952, the Libyan-American Technical Assistance 
Service was established under an agreement concluded by 
the governments of Libya and the United States. Amounts 
of approximately 2,000,000 dollars a year were furnished 
~or technical development. LATAS, at its inception, 
utilized as its basis o~ operation the reports and surveys 
prepared by the UN Missions during the planning phase. 
A United States Operations Mission was in charge of the 
administration and ~inancing o~ the programme. However, 
a marked lack of co-operation between USOM and the Libyan 
departments on the provincial level resulted in the aboli-
tion o~ LATAS in 1955· To replace it, the Libyan-American 
Joint Services, a series of co-operative services, were 
established designed in such a way as to create closer 
co-ordination and co-operation between it and the Libyan 
government on all levels. 
One year before, in 1954, the Libyan and United States 
governments signed a seventeen-year agreement concerned 
with American bases in Tripoli. According to this agree-
ment, Libya receives 4,000,000 a year during the first six 
years and 1,000,000 a year for the remaining eleven years. 
These funds are a~ed at financing the building and re-
designing of public works. In addition to this agreement, 
a separate economic agreement was signed providing fUnds 
for economic development. Such funds are appropriated 
annuallyby Congress and total 7,000,000 for 1957.5 
During this period, a Libyan-American Reconstruction 
Commission was organized to study and plan the development-
al programmes to be carried out with the American funds. 
The members of LARC were not only Libyan officials and 
members of the American technical assistance programme, 
but also experts from UN technical assistance. 
On the side of the Libyan government, apart from the 
establishment of LPDSA, which was primarily a body designed 
for the channeling of funds received on a bilateral level, 
there was an urgent need for some organization that could 
act as co-ordinator and communicator for all projects 
carried out by every type of technical assistance. For 
this purpose an Economic Planning Committee was established 
in April 1952. The Committee was largely advisory, 
but by the nature of its composition developed into an 
authoritative organ. Its president was the National 
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Finance Minister, while high provincial administrators made 
up the bulk of its membership. In addition to this, the 
United Nations Resident Technical Assist?nce Representative, 
the Director of LATAS and the Financial and Economic Ad-
viser to the Libyan government were also members. Prior 
to independence, the provi ncial governments had begun to 
formulate plans for economic development, which were un-
integrated and very often too pretentious in scope. After 
a considerable amount of deliberation and pruning, these 
plans were integrated into one main federal plan and ap-
proved by the Economic ' Planning Committee. Although the 
Committee was established with much enthusiasm, the small 
size of its secretariat and inadequate executive staff made 
it an ineffectual body, incapable of implementing the fUnc-
tions assigned to it. As a result, it was abolished in 
1956, to be replaced by a Development Council, the pri-
mary tasks of which were to act as a general clearing 
organization for the gathering and compilation of infor-
mation received from all sources of developmental activity 
and, secondly, to study and :formulate overall plans for 
economic development. It is difficult to judge the merits 
of the Council at this date as it has not had time to 
mature to its full efficiency. 
All these preparations and organizations had a single 
purpose; that of implementing the projects formulated by 
the planning experts and financed by aid from abroad. 
Although a number of persons seem to be badly disappointed 
by what has been accomplished in Libya during the past 
five years, a description of those projects will show that 
much of the work done has meant a very real difference 
to the people of Libya. 
Much progress can be noted in the field of agricul-
t ure. An FAO expert on marketing went to Libya and helped 
establish a sheep-exporting o.rganization, which resulted 
in an export increase of almost 300 per cent, 6 in addition 
t o which the improved quality of the stock brought better 
prices. These two factors, combined with a reduction of 
the percentage taken by the middleman meant that the sheep-
raiser managed to earn considerably more than he had before. 
At the recommendation of the same expert, the Libyan citrus 
growers formed a co-operative citrus marketing organization, 
and, using their own funds and some lent to them by t he 
Libyan Finance Corporation, bought an assembly line machine 
which washes, polishes and sorts the fruit for packing . 
The co-operative, having proved to be such a success, was 
legally incorporated and the government enacted a set of 
sanitary codes and regulations, thereby raising the quality 
of the fruit to a level where it could be effective com-
petition for other citrus-producing countries on the northern 
European markets. Another expert was brought in to demon-
strate modern spraying techniques. The same co - operative 
established a small team of sprayers, which went through 
the grove with the proper equipment at the right time of 
year, and made considerable progress in the elimination 
of the Mediterranean fruit fly pest. Viewed in terms of 
the Libyan economy, the results are most dramatic. The 
export of citrus fruit began in February, 1953; halfWay 
through the season, and during that same year the volume 
increased by 103 per cent, while the prices went up 70 
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per cent. Halfway through the next season, the volume of 
exports had increased seven-fold and more orders had been 
received than could be met.7 It is important to note here 
that Libya was selling its citrus fruits on the north Euro-
pean quality markets, something never before accomplished. 
Another considerable improvement was attained in the 
export of' sheep hides and skin. An Australian sheep-expert 
made circuits of sheep stations demonstrating improved 
methods of feeding, range management and disease control. 
In this latter field, one can find an excellent example 
of native cautiousness. The method for disease control 
consists of driving the sheep through a bath of chemical 
solutions. At first the sheep raisers were extremely skep-
tical of such radical methods. This attitude was slowly 
overcome as it became apparent that such methods really did 
have positive results, and progressively more farmers began 
voluntarily bringing in their sheep for dipping. In addi-
tion, sheep, and especially superior rams, were imported 
from Turkey for breeding purposes. Improved methods of 
shearing and tanning, and a definite system of grading con-
tributed to the export of better quality hides and wool. 
These were tentatively tried out on the American, Italian 
and English markets and sold well, creating a demand for 
more products. 
Considerable progress has been made in forestry and 
sand-dune fixation by a French expert with considerable 
experience in Morocco. Under his guidance, the government 
planted more than 1,500,000 eucalyptus, olive and palm trees, 
serving the dual purpose of increasing the volume of olives 
and acting as a barrier against sand encroachment.8 In 
addition to this, a plan of shelter-belt and fixing sand-
dunes through the use of live grass was implemented. These 
projects assimilated some of the large unemployment force, 
thereby easing the pressure of relief from the government. 
One of the largest projects implemented by the United 
Nations was ILO's establishment of a Technical and Vocational 
Training Centre in Tripoli. ILO :furnished a staff' of thirty-
five instructors to train young Libyans in such vocations 
as clerical work, the repair of agricultural equipment, 
maintenance, machinery and building. On leaving the Centre, 
these young men sign a two-year contract with the Libyan 
government. This is a long-term project, as the training 
will also be for private firma when government needs are 
filled. 
The largest UNESCO Mission in the world, approximately 
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twenty-five experts, is located in Libya. It has established 
two teachers training centres, in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
Attached to both of these centres are model-schools, where 
children are taught both by the regular staff and the student 
teachers. This is a tremendous psychological advancement 
in a Moslem country like Libya, where up until a very few 
years ago, all women were kept heavily veiled and secluded. 
Now some of these girls are trained to look after small 
children and teach them in the most modern atmosphere a-
vailable. The change has not only been in the women them-
selves, but also even in their fathers, who are beginning 
to permit them to leave the home. 
UNESCO is also very active in the field of adult edu-
cation. Two experts were sent to the Fezzan and have pro-
duced some remarkable results. The adult population is 
being taught to read and write, and demonstrations are 
given in the use of small tools and equipment, while ex-
periments, performed with the eo-operation and aid of local 
farmers, are using seed furnished by FAO for training in 
practical agriculture. In the oasis of Brak, which is the 
centre for these projects, the villagers were encouraged 
to clean up their local well (used for both human consumption 
and stock watering) by the simple expedient of lining it 
with cement and keeping the water constantly flowing. 
The education is carried on predominantly with the help 
of audio-visual methods (e.g., films, demonstrations, and 
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practical projects). This programme has been so popular 
with the Libyans that there is a great demand for more of 
this type of assistance. 
UNESCO is also helping the Libyan government to pre-
pare textbooks in history, geography and civics. 
In the field of health, the most important projects 
have been the establishment by WHO and UNICEF of maternal 
and child health centres, where mothers are taught, by 
demonstration, better methods of feeding and taking care 
of babies and children. In addition, there is a programme 
for nurse and midwifery training, and again is seen the 
amazing change in the attitude of the young women. WHO 
has carried on a large tuberculosis prevention programme, 
the results of which, however, will be slow in coming due 
to the low standard of living. It has also provided a 
public health administrator, who is advising the federal 
and provincial governments with their health and sanitation 
programmes. 
Although United Nations Technical Assistance differs 
in a number of ways from that provided by the United States, 
perhaps the most important divergence is that UN assistance 
is one of kind rather than the furnishing of financial aid, 
which is the basis of US technical assistance. Another 
difference is that the missions of experts sent out by 
the UN and the Specialized Agencies have a certain amount 
of time in one country to accomplish their purposes and 
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are then recalled to furnish personnel for missions in 
other countries. Aid, as given by the US, tends to be of 
a much more permanent nature, the experts staying in a 
particular country until the specific project or programme 
has been completed. As a result, the projects undertaken 
by TAB and those ~plemented by LAJS in Libya are different 
in both nature and scope. The UN and the agencies tend 
to limit their operations to short-run, developmental pro-
jects requiring often only demonstration and teaching to 
put them into effect and giving the population a modicum 
of knowledge on which to base subsequent long-range pro-
grammes. An analysis of the projects carried out by LAJS 
show them to be not only developmental in nature, but also 
constructual, dealing with such problems as restoration of 
war-damaged public works and new buildings. For instance, in 
the field of agriculture, a Vocational Agricultural Training 
Centre was established with the express purpose of training 
fUture officials for the federal and provincial governments; 
specifically, their Departments of Agriculture. Three grain 
silos in Cyrenaica, which were damaged by war, were rebuilt 
and are now stocking barley and wheat, thereby reducing the 
need for importing these commodities in time of drought. 
As wadis (i.e., mountain stream beds that are dry except 
during the rainy season) are a potential source of surface 
water, LAJS built dams designed to create reservoirs from 
which water can be channeled at will. Recently, the National 
Agricultural Bank of Libya was created with the help of 
fUnds fUrnished by LARC. It will provide loans on easy 
terms, especially to those small farmers who cannot afford 
security. In effect, the. Bank considers the improvements 
resulting from the loans as adequate collateral. In ad-
dition, the Bank finances pools of agricultural equipment 
that can be borrowed or used on a co-operative basis. 
In the field of health, the major amount of work is 
performed by LAJS both on the preventative and curative 
sides. It has instigated large programmes of trachoma and 
typhus control and started projects to improve sanitation. 
It has also helped the provincial departments to set up 
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the organization and buildings necessary to carry out ef-
fective health and sanitation programmes. Some work has 
been done toward the restoration and construction of clinics 
and hospitals. 
In education, the American technical assistance is 
mostly concerned with the building of thirteen elementary 
schools and the establishment of technical training centres, 
similar to the one set up by ILO and giving the same type 
of curriculum. In addition to this, LARC has provided 
funds for the purchasing of books, desks and equipment 
for the rural schools in the Fezzan. 
As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, the avail-
able information concerning water resources and irrigation 
was inadequate, making the formulation of any long-range 
plans impossible. The US technical assistance programme 
has been making considerable surveys in this field and 
has procured valuable information. 
Although the programmes put into operation by LAJS 
and the UN are different, this does not imply that they 
contradict each other. On the contrary, as shown in the 
organizational set up of the various administrations, a 
conscious effort has been made to attain as large a degree 
of co-ordination and co-operation as possible. Therefore, 
the two types of programmes tend, on the whole, to comple-
ment each other, and, in one or two particular instances, 
the UN and the· Americans have carried out joint projects. 
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A case in point is the pilot project of farm settlement 
carried on by FAO and LAJS. A group of settlements, origi-
nally constructed by the Italians for the use of their col-
onists, has been restored and rehabilitated. The plan is to 
find families with some experience in farming to situate 
here. As an incentive, the families would be given poultry, 
sheep and goats, and provided with improved seeds furnished 
by FAO through a nearby experimental station. Should this 
venture succeed, it would serve as an excellent incentive 
and model for similar settlement programmes in the .future. 
LAJS and LARC have helped UN Technical Assistance in 
other programmes by providing the much needed equipment 
for which neither the Libyan government nor TAB could pay, 
such as furnishing books and equipment for rural schools 
and adult education centres in which the UN experts are 
working. 
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The future programmes and plans, as envisaged by the 
Libyan government, cannot by~·:necessity be grandiose or 
dramatic. The country will have to continue to strengthen 
the basis of its economy, to improve the standard of l iving 
and the balance of trade, and to alleviate the social con-
ditions of its people before it can attempt any monumental 
economic development projects, such as would be readily 
understood by the western mind. The prospects seem to be 
a continuation of small action projects in all fields of 
economics and social life. However, in a speech made in 
the Economic Committee of the General Assembly on January 
8, 1957, Mr. Misallati, the Libyan delegate to the UN, 
stated that the Libyan government was beginning the promo-
tion of light industry and was envisaging the introduction 
of a normal credit system to replace the existing interest -
free loans. 
A certain number of private companies have been main-
taining staffs in Libya on the possibility of the existence 
of oil. Although surveys are being made, no formal announce-
ment has as yet been made, forcing both the Libyan govern-
ment and all the technical assistance organs to continue 
economic development along the lines of the original pro-
gram. To deviate with no adequate proof or reason would be 
foolhardy and could be most damaging to past development gains. 
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The establishment of a Special United Nations Fund 
for Economic Development, which is, at the moment, under 
discussion in the United Nations, would make it possible 
for Libya to extend her developmental programmes to a con-
siderable extent. SUNFED, if organized, would be set up 
specifically for the tunnelling of additional technical 
assistance loans made by individual countries wishirg to 
have their grants utilized on a multilateral basis. If 
such an organization is established, it would mean definite 
benefits for Libya, this country having been mentioned 




· 1. United Nations Economic and Social Council~ Ques-
tion of Assistance to Libya~ (Communication dated 27 June 
1g53 from the Acting Prime Minister of Libya)~ Doc. E/246g~ 
June 1g53, P· g. . 
2 • .!.EM.•, p. g. 
3· From the Rroofs of Mrs. Agnese N. Lockwood's forth-
coming article, Libya - Build in~ a Desert Economy~" Inter-
national Conciliation, No. 512~ (March 1g57), p. 324. 
4. Ibid., pp. 322-324. 
5. Ibid., p. 325. 
6. 11Shared Skills in Libya,'' United Nations Review, 
I (July lg54), p. 66. 
7 • Ibid . , pp . 67-68. 
8 • Ibid • , p • 6 5 • 
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CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The techniques of technical assistance are exception-
ally well illustrated in the case of Libya, for in this 
instance it was a matter of starting with a olean slate. 
Libya differs in twq main respects from other under-
_ developed countries. One is the fact that, as a result 
of historical events and incidents, Libya was given the 
unique quality of being the first country in the world 
that attained its independence, not after a long struggle 
against imperialistic powers, not after a .long period of 
trusteeship but · as a ward and responsibility of the United 
Nations,; The energies so often expended to break the chains 
of domination, real or imaginary, were free to be directed 
toward achieving mature Statehood. This feeling of respons-
ibility will always remain strong in the UN, and it will 
always give special consideration to the needs of its former 
ward. The other fact is that Libya, at the time of its 
independence, was a country totally without economic assets 
or potentialities on which development could be based. 
Technical assistance meant starting at the very foundations 
of econ.omic life, an attempt to raise the standard of living 
in all its social, economic and political aspects. An 
impressive start was made by the UN Commissioner during 
his two-year stay in the country, for his presence as ar-
bitrator, leader, father confessor and co-ordinator did 
much to minimize the frictions and problems arising out 
of such a precarious situation. It has been felt by many 
people that a three-year transition period would have been 
more beneficial in the long run to the people of Libya. 
Be that as it may, the two years in which the country was 
preparing for independence were extremely busy ones, for 
it was during this time that the preliminary phases of 
technical assistance were carried out. It was the time 
during which experts in every field possible were sent 
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out to make studies and surveys of conditions as they ex-
isted and compile these into lengthy and detailed reports, 
incorporating into these their recommendations for improve-
ment. These reports, in turn, were discussed, condensed, 
elaborated upon and finally emerged into one major plan 
for the economic and social development of Libya. The 
planners were faced with a difficult problem, at this point. 
On the one hand, the projects formulated then were extreme-
ly detailed, listing to the last hoe, rake and grafting 
knife (small type) necessary for development. The govern-
ment implementing the programmes must have the scope and 
knowledge necessary to take those details into consideration 
and at the same time retain the intelligent plasticity to 
bypass them if it should prove more expedient. On the other 
hand, the plans and programmes had to be flexible enough 
. to take any unforeseen event, like an unexpected drought 
or locust plague, into consideration. Another reason for 
malleability was the unknown outcome of any particular 
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plan. The relatively large increase in export, as a result 
of the improvement of citrus fruits, was unexpected and, 
therefore, meant that some funds could be diverted into 
other projects. The large discrepancy between the wealth 
of material available for analysis during the country's 
transitional period and the complete dearth of publications 
and documents existing for the period following independence 
made it difficult to analyze in any great detail the im-
plementation of all the plans proposed by the experts. 
Enough was found, however, to conclude that on the whole 
the projects were well-established and had a good chance 
of successful implementation. 
This brings me to the greatest problem faced by the 
government of Libya and the technical assistance programmes 
-- lack of financial resources. The basis upon which UN 
Technical Assistance operates is one of self-help, whereby 
TAB produces the experts, the know-how and, to some extent, 
the equipment. Ideally speaking, the host country is sup-
posed to meet financial expenses. In the case of Libya, 
this condition was particularly hard to fulfill due to 
the newness of the Libyan government and its resulting 
lack of administrators and finances. The establishment 
of SUNFED·would do much to alleviate this problem. 
Another financial problem encountered, but of a dif-
ferent nature, can be seen particularly in the work done 
by the UNESCO mission. As mentioned, this mission is a 
large one and the experts often ran into the difficulty 
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of not having enough operating funds at their disposal, this 
deficiency being often alleviated with the help of LAJS . 
This problem obviously results from a lack of foresight 
on the administrative side of TAB and an understandable 
abundance of enthusiasm and optimism on the part of the 
Libyan government in estimating its budget. The difficul-
ty could pe mitigated by reducing the scope and, therefore, 
the size of the missions, enabling them to operate within 
their allotted budgets. Although this means a slight re-
duction in projects,. the advantages gained would certainly 
make the remaining projects more effective. 
One of the main stumbling blo?ks throughout the last 
few years has been a certain lack of co-ordination between 
.the Libyan government, .the UN Technical Assistance Pro-
gramme and the US programme. However, .ali three entities 
being fully conscious of this fact, constant effort has been 
and is being made to alter this. The abolition of LATAS 
and the establishment of LAJS is a point in case, . as well 
as the replacement of the Libyan Economic Planning Committee 
by the Development Council. 
This brings me to the evaluation of multilateral as 
opposed to bilateral aid. Both have their advantages and 
drawbacks . The main difference can be found in the basis 
on which assistance is given. United States assistance 
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is operated on a financial basis, wherein the United States 
provides funds for a previously specified number of years 
in return for certain military pr~vileges. This is a two -
edged sword. On the one hand~ we find that Libya is i nsured 
definite financial security, a source of significant revenue 
with which she can carry out her more pretentious projects, 
such as building. On the other hand, this means that she 
is partially dependent upon the bounty of another country, 
a psychologica.l consideration that is sometimes hard to 
accept by a newly created and politically independent nation. 
United Nations technical assistance, by acting as a neutral 
and international agency, eliminates any such uncomfortable 
fee l ing and its inevitable psychological reactions. A 
new International Development Advisory Board of the United 
States government has suggested the establishment of a fund 
for under-developed countries, which would be totally di-
vorced from any military or non-financial obligations. 
This step would do much to eliminate misunderstanding in the 
United States and suspicion abroad as to the intentions 
of the US. 
If, on the financial side, the UN Technical Assistance 
Programme seems to be working at a disadvantage as compared 
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to LAJS, there are certain counter-balancing factors most 
worthy of consideration. As a result of its international 
character, TAB is able to recruit experts from any area 
of the world, thus assuring a high calibre of efficiency. 
We see in Libya, for instance, an Australian sheep expert, 
a French expert familiar with forestry and sand-dune fixa-
tion in Morocco and a number of Arabic-speaking instructors 
from Egypt, Jordan and Iran. LAJS, forced to depend solely 
on American nationals, is often hampered by the comparative-
ly restricted choice and national outlook of the experts. 
It would be unwise to advise the abolition of either of 
the two technical assistance programmes in favpr of the 
other. In practice, they have shown to complement each 
other extremely well, the US providing the greater part 
of the financial assistance necessary for large-scale de-
velopment and the UN furnishing the highly capable experts 
to carry out the short-term action projects, both combining 
into as efficient a system as possible to improve Libya's 
standard of living. 
The question that remains to be answered now is 
whether the theory of technical assistance is the most 
efficient one for the purpose of improving the economic 
conditions of under-developed countries. That this pur-
pose is necessary is unquestionable, if not from the 
humanitarian and moral point of view, then from the point 
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of view that it is to our best interests. The forces of 
modern nationalism cannot be stemmed and have the potential 
for international dissolution or political maturity. The 
responsibility lies for the most part with the Member States 
of the United Nations. Existing economic conditions form, 
to a large degree the temperament of a people. If they 
are to remain friendly to us and not be a temptation to the 
inevitable aggressor, it is our task to give them the assis-
tance, both financial and in action~ and the incentive 
that will enable them to work toward the betterment of their 
own lot. 
Technicalassistance programmes of all kinds, whether 
they are multilateral or bilateral, are the most efficient 
and practical methods through which the fate of humankind 
can be improved. 
It is a challenge to western civilization -, to 
make that which it has spread over the world into 
something truly and permanently good. It has preached 
the value of personality, love for our neighbour 
and respect also for his temporal life. Will it now 
really have the courage to apply these on a general 
scale? If it becomes unfaithful to its own message, 
it will be pushed back to its starting points, and 
rolled up like an old parchment. Its chance of life 
will be cut off. It will have no more future.l 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Address delivered by Her Majesty the Queen of the 
Netherlands at Leyden on June 18, 1955 to the Netherlands 





Funds made available out of the Special Account for Technical 
Assistance for the Specialized Agencies in accordance with 
the following percentage: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations 
United Nations 
World Health Organization 
United Nations Educational, Scientif'ic 
and C~ltural Organization 
International Labour Organization 









In 1951 the General Assembly approved the participation of' 
the International Telecommunication Union and the World 
Meteorological ·organization in the Programme. Funds would 
be made available to these two organizations by the United 
Nations out of its share of the Special Account. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the International Monetary Fund also co-operate, but do 
not draw funds from the Account. 
United Nations Technical Assistance, Background Paper 
No. 74, January 1, 1953 (Dept. of Public Information, United 
Nations, New York). . 
TABLE II 
A BUDGET FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF LmYA 
105 
1. Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency 
A. General Education 
a. Equipment 









ing centre 15,000 
ii. Men's teachers' 
training, Tripoli 3,500 
iii. Teachers training, 
Benghazi 10,000 
iv. Additions to 
schools- 10,000 
v. New schools 
B-Priority: 















A-Priority: B-Priority: C-Priority: 




B. Technical ~raining 
for Agriculture 
a. Equipment 5,000 3,000 
b. Buildings 7,000 1,000 
c. Animals 1,500 500 
TOTAL :bl3,500 b 4,500 
c. Technical Training 
for Industrz 
-a. Equipment 
i. Two workshops 10,000 2,000 
ii. Technical Schools 30,000 2,000 
b. Buildings 
i. Two workshops 7,000 1,500 
ii. Technical Schools 13,000 1,500 
TOTAL :b60,000 :r:, 7,000 
/ 
D. Agricultural Institute 
a. Research and experiments 
{local staff) 
b. Projects Investigation 
Service (local staff) 
c. Special projects 
i. Nurseries {crop trees) 
ii. Pure Seed programme 
iii. Livestock disease 
control 
iv. Wind breaks 
d. Buildings and equipment 
TOTAL 
E. Agricultural ImErovement 
Agency 
a. Agricultural Credit 
Service {subsidies) 
b. Settlement Assistance 
Service 
i. Regular programme . 
ii. Tree planting {crops) 
iii. Small tools develop-
ment 
c. Range Improvement 
Service 
i. Regular programme 
ii. Stock watering 
wells 
iii. Range reseeding 























Avg. next 5 Reserve for 
years Employment-
Creation or 


















F. Public Utilities and 
Public Works 
a. Harbors 
b. Municipal water 
systems 
c. Roads and bridges 
d. Electricity generation 
and supply 
e. Sewers 




Less:works recommended for 
execution by the Libyan 
Government of foreign 
governments as special 
projects financed at their 
own expense: 
Recommended total 
G. Water Supply and 
Irrigation 




c. Cisterns, irrigation 







Proposals Avg. next 5 





















































A-Priority: B-Priority : 0 -Priority: 
Proposals Avg. next 5 Employment-
for 1952/53 years Creation or 
Later Years 
I. Social DeveloEment 
a. School feeding 100,000 200,000 (per 
year) 
b. Shirts for school 
children 5,000 10,000 (per 
year) 
e. Training blind 
persons 
i. Building 15,000 
ii • Equipment 5,000 
d. Housing (subsidies) 25,000 65,000 
e. Community centers 
(equipment) 5,000 10,000 
f. Orphanage 
i. ·Building 1,000 
ii. Operating Cost 5,000 
TOTAL :b25,QOO :b201,000 lJ.O,OOO plus 
:h210,000 per 
year 
J. Stabilization Fund 225,000 150,000 








2. Libyan Finance Corporation 
A-Priority: B-Priority: 
Loans in Average out-
1952/53 standing. 
Next 5 years 
Loan to Agricultural Credit 
Service 150,000 200,000 
Housing 
(Assuming banks provide 
four-fifths of capital) 50,000 90,000 
Fisheries 
a. Boats 5,000 5,000 
b. Refrigerated warehouse 
and trucks 5,000 10,000 
c. Canneries 15,000 
Handicrafts 
a. Materials and 
equipment 10,000 
TOTAL :b.210,000 :&330,000 
United Nations Mission in Libya, The Econo~c and Social 
Development of Libya, Doc. A/AC.32/TA.16, June 1952, pp. 341-
345. 
TABLE III 
EXPANDED PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL ASS ISTANCE TO LIBYA 
Assistance Provided During l950 1956* 
(I) Project Costs 
Organ. 1950-1951 
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1955 Exp. Fel. 
6 4 
2 2 
43 64 33 
15 2 21 
11 60 y 16 
1 
~ __]. 




























lJ Including a number of study grants awarded to students for attendance at 
training centres and seminars. 
* For more detailed informat ion, see Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX A 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ABBREVIATIONS 
ECOSOC ••••• Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
FAO ••••.•.• Food and Agriculture Organization 
ICAG ••••••• International Civil Aviation Organization 
ILO •••••••• International Labour Organization 
ITU •••••••• International Telecommunication Union 
LAJS ••••••• Libyan-American Joint Services 
LARC •••••.. Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission 
LATAS ..•..• Libyan-American Technical Assistance Service 
LPDSA •.•••• Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency 
SUNFED ••••• Special United Nations Fund for Economic Develop-
ment 
TAB ••••.••• Technical Assistance Board 
TAC .•••••.• Technical Assistance Committee 
UN .•••••••• United Nations 
UNESCO •.••• United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultur-
al Organization 
UNICEF ••.•• United Nations International Childrens (Emergency) 
Fund 
UNTAA •••.•• United Nations Technical Assistance Administration 
USOM •••••.• United States Operations Mission 
WHO ••.•••.• world Health Organization 
WMO ••••••.• World Meterological Organization 
APPENDIX B 
UNITED NAT IONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 289(IV): LIBYA 
21 NOVEMBER 1949 
The General Assembly •.• 
With respect to Libya, recommends: 
1. That Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania 
and the Fezzan, shall be constituted an independent and 
sovereign State; 
2. That this independence shall become effective 
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as soon as possible and in any case not later than 1 Jan-
uary 1952; 
3. That a constitution for Libya, including the form 
of the government, shall be determined by representatives 
of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fez-
zan meeting and consulting together in a National Assembly; 
4. That, for the purpose of assisting the people 
of Libya in the formulation of the constitution and t he 
establishment of an independent Government, there shall 
be a United Nations Commissioner in Libya appointed by 
the General Assembly and a Council to aid and advise him; 
5. That the United Nations Commissioner, in consul-
tation with the Council, shall submit to the Secretary-
General an annual report and such other special reports 
a s he may consider necessary. To these reports shall be 
added any memorandum or document that the United Nations 
Commissioner or a member of the Council may wish to bring 
to the attention of the United Nations; 
6. That the Council shall consist of ten members, 
namely: (a) One representative nominated by the Government 
of each of the following countries: Egypt, France, Italy, 
Pakistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America; 
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(b) One representative of the people of each of the 
three regions of Libya and one representative of the minor-
ities in Libya; 
7. That the United Nations Commissioner shall appoint 
the representatives mentioned in paragraph 6 (b), after 
consultation with the Administering Powers, the representa-
tives of the Governments mentioned in paragraph 6 (a), 
leading personalities and representatives of political 
parties and organizations in the territories concerned; 
8. That, in the discharge of his functions, the United 
Nations Commissioner shall consult and be guided by the ad-
vice of the members of his Council, it being understood 
that he may call upon different members to advise him in 
respect of different ·regions or different subjects; 
9. That the United Nations Commissioner may offer 
suggestions to the General Assembly, to the Economic and 
Social Council and to the Secretary-General as to the meas-
ures that the United Nations might adopt during the transi-
tional period regarding the economic and social problems 
of Libya; 
10. That the Administering Powers in co-operation 
with the United Nations Commissioner: 
(a) -Initiate immediately all necessary steps for 
the transfer of power to a duly constituted independent 
Government; 
(b) Administer the territories for the purpose of 
assisting in the establishment of Libyan unity and inde-
pendence, co-operate in the formation of governmental in-
stitutions and eo-ordinate their activities to this end; 
(c) Make an annual report to the General Assembly 
on the steps taken to implement these recommendations; 
11. That upon its establishment as an independent 
State, Libya shall be admitted to the United Nations i n 
accordance with Article 4 of the Charter. 
APPENDIX C 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 
PROGRAMME ACTIVrriES IN LIBYA, 1955-1956 
Land and Water Use and ricultural Machiner • 
settlement specia 1st s assisting the Government in 
plans for colonization and settlement in areas where 







A small tools expert surveyed the agricultural areas 
of the country and has submitted a report to the Government 
containing recommendations for improvements in hand and 
animal drawn implements and the introduction of improved 
types of such equipment. 
Plant Producti~n and .Protection. The two agronomists 
engaged in crop improvement, one in Tripolitania and t he 
other in Cyrenaica , continued with success their comprehen-
sive programs of i nvestigation, selection, demonstration 
and seed multiplicat ion, embracing cereals, pulses, potatoes 
and fodder crops on both irrigated and non-irrigated l and. 
The two horticulturists, in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
••• are engaged in developing horticultural programs designed 
to increase output and improve quality. In Tripolitania, 
the specialist is giving particular attention to the reno-
vation of olive groves and the provision through Government 
nurseries, of adequate supplies of planting material, of 
olive ovules, seedlings and grafted plants. In all, some 
800,000 were grown in 1955. In both provinces the work on 
introduction and propagation of deciduous fruit trees was 
appreciably expanded . In Cyrenaica three previously aban-
d"Oned Government experiment farms have been taken over by 
the expert. 
The plant protection expert has continued his studies 
on the seasonal procedures and life history of the major 
insect pests. He has also continued control experiments 
on these pests, including the olive fly which is particu-
larly destructive in the country. On the basis of his in-
vestigations he has set up numerous demonstratipns and pub-
lished pertinent recommendations in the local language for 
the use of growers. 
In 1956 an agronomist will advise the Government on 
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developing and operating a program for improving crop pro-
duction in the Fezzan. He will investigate and appraise 
the crop production problems of the area arid determine the 
measures which need to be adopted to achieve the desired 
improvements, assist in the introduction and testing of 
improved varieties suited to the area, and train local tech-
nicians in improved cultural methods. 
Animal Production and Disease Control. A dairying 
expert surveyed the possibilities of the re-establishment 
of a processing plant in Tripoli, having carried out a sur-
vey of the supply position. . .. 
Assistance is continued in the improvement· of sheep 
breeding at one station in Cyrenaica and one in Tripoli-
tania. Turkish alkaramen and merino sheep are imported 
by FAO for improving the local sheep. Results are encour-
ing. 
A veterinarian is advising on general livestock pro-
duction problems with particular reference to annual health 
problems. He has advised on breeds and on setting up food 
reserves with the assistance of the US bilateral program. 
Fellowships: Animal husbandry (1). 
Agricultural Institutions and Services. The FAO Country 
Representative acts also as an agricultural adviser to the 
Government and is concerned with the organization and de-
velopment of the Ministry of Agriculture, the operation 
of the Sidi Mesri experimental station and other experimen-
tal and demonstration stations and in coordinating the work 
of the FAO experts. He is assisted by an expert in agri-
cultural administration. 
Rural Welfare. A cooperatives expert has assisted 
in the organization of agricultural cooperatives and in 
the drafting of a cooperatives law. Four olive oil produc-
tion cooperatives have been established during the past 
year under his supervision. Two fellows are being trained 
under FAO fellowships who will provide the nucleus of the 
new cooperative service. 
A date processing and packaging specialist has been 
supervising the installation and operation of a considerable 
quantity of machinery bought by the Government, and is pro-
cessing large quantities of dates, in connection with the 
Government's school feeding program. A hides and skin spe-
cialist has previously operated chiefly in Tripolitania. 
A new expert will now turn his attention to Cyrenaica where 
technical assistance has previously been given on a limited 
scale under the project and will help in developing improved 
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flaying and curing centres around Benghazi. 
Fellowships: Cooperatives and credit (1). 
Hides and skins (1). 
Economics. A marketing expert has continued his ac-
tivities to improve the standards of quality for citrus pro-
duction and in finding export outlets for this crop abroad. 
The expert has also paid attention to olive oil marketing 
and attended the olive oil conference held in Madrid in 
1955, as the representative of the Libyan Government. The 
expert has travelled to a number of Mediterranean countries 
on behalf of the Government to promote export sales of Libyan 
products. He has collaborated with the FAO food processing 
expert on the selection of sites and in recommending stor-
age capacities and temperature control in the provision 
of refrigerated stores at Tripoli and Benghazi, in order 
to establish a good export trade in perishable food products. 
The expert also advises the cooperative organizations for 
marketing previously established by him. 
An agricultural statistician will assist the Govern-
ment in evolving methods for the collection of statistical 
data for agricultural products and in establishing adequate 
services for agricultural statistics. 
Fellowships: Agricultural statistics. 
Forestry. A forestry adviser is· assisting in laying 
down a forest policy and is advising the Government on Suit-
able legislation. He is also assisting in organizing the 
forestry administration and collaborates with the US bilat-
eral program foresters, who are primarily engaged in prac-
tical and extension work. 
Fellowships: Forestry (2). 
Nutrition. On the basis of a joint FAO/WHO survey, 
an FAO nutritionist has been appointed to assist in the 
development of a school feeding program and related nutri-
tion education activities. UNICEF is cooperating 1n this 
project by providing food supplies and equipment for this 
program. 
A food technologist investigated local horticultural 
products suitable for preservation and recommended the es-
tablishment of a factory to manufacture various food pro-
ducts from the raw material, much of whi.ch is at present 
wasted. 
Fisheries (to begin in 1956). A fishery specialist 
will advise the Government on the formulation of a fishery 
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policy, based on a reconnaissance survey of the availabil-
ity of fish stocks, and of possible methods of catching, 
storing and utilization of the fish. As appropriate, he 
will advise on the implementation of the policy so formu-
lated, on the extent of further expert assistance required, 
on the provision of fishery services, and on measures to 
stimulate development on economic lines of a fishery indus -
try. 
Two further specialists in the field of fisheries will 
be supplied whose posts will be defined when results of 
above reconnaissance survey are shown. 
Excerpt from Project Description provided by the Partici-
pating Organizations of the Expanded Programme of Techni-
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ABSTRACT 
UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN LIBYA 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION 
The formation of the United Nations and the Special-
ized Agencies was an action motivated primarily by a sin-
cere desire on the part of the world to minimize all situa-
tions leading to war. These can stem from any number of 
factors~ but it is reasonable to assume that economic and 
social conditions rank among the most important. Thus~ we 
find in the United Nations an instrument to improve the 
economic and social conditions of the world. This thesis 
explains and defines the efforts of the Technical Assistance 
Programme and Specialized Agencies by analysing their pro-
grammes in Libya and by drawing from these analyses con-
clusions concerning the efficacy of Technical Assistance 
as a method of alleviating socio-economic underdevelopment. 
The focus is on the Food and Agriculture Organization for 
two reasons: a detailed dissertation of the technical 
assistance projects by all the Specialized Agencies, even 
in a single country~ would be repetitive, extending the 
thesis beyond the limits necessary to its purpose; as 
Libya is primarily an agricultural country, all projects 
initiated there are fundamentally to increase agricultural 
productivity. 
The plans formulated during World War II to establish 
an international agency concerned with feeding the world 
were based on the ideas of agriculturists, nutritionists 
and statesmen of the nineteen-twenties and thirties, though 
their theories did not materialize into efficient organiza-
tional implementation because of greater univeral submergence 
in political matters and a general lack of international con-
science. The war forcefully brought the realization that 
economic, population and food problems must be ameliorated 
through international action; the result was the establish-
ment in 1944 of the Food and Agriculture Organization, whose 
fundamental aim is to raise world productivity primarily as 
a co-ordinator and initiator in those fields where national 
attempts proved insufficient. To achieve integrated pro-
grammes with other Specialized Agencies, agreements have 
been signed providing for close cooperation and regular 
consultation in matters of common concern. The Expanded 
Technical Assistance Programme of the United Nations, the 
co-ordinator which integrates and directs those efforts 
involving more than one specialized agency, was established 
in 1949 and has been the major directive force in the imple-
mentation of multilateral technical assistance. 
The best method of evaluating UNTAA is by comprehen-
sively studying an area whose socio-economic conditions 
necessitate assistance programmes in all fields. Libya, 
historically under constant colonial domination, was guaran-
teed independence by 1952 through a General Assembly resolu-
tion passed in 1949. The Assembly also appointed a Commis-
s i oner for the two intervening years to aid the country in 
its monumental task. An underdeveloped country with a mar-
ginal agricultural economy~ Libya was basically handicapped 
by inadequate rainfall and infertile soil. The indigenous 
population was untrained in the proper utilization and ir-
rigation of land and the conservation of water, and was 
further hampered by the lack of material resources and 
technical knowledge. 
Because of the complete lack of factual and statistical 
area information, the first step on the part of UNTAA was a 
survey of local conditions and their compilation in two major 
documents. The first points out that the key to development 
lay in basic and technical education and the use of pilot 
proj~cts; the second enumerates the particular problems in-
herent to Libya and proposes an extensive set of short and 
long-term programmes. Because of the latent skills of the 
people was the only major resource, the first task consisted 
of raising the country-s productivity by teaching the people 
to do better what they were already doing. Because of the 
limited available budget, it seemed most profitable to 
develop those fields of agriculture and animal husbandry 
already significant in foreign and domestic trade, rather 
than initiate new areas of expansion. Therefore, projects 
were proposed to establish an administrative and financial 
framework designed to direct and implement plans for the 
increase and improvement of products and marketing . The 
highest priority was given to projects dealing with experi-
mental, educational and demonstrational work such as seed 
research and multiplication, breeding experiments, credit 
extension and small tool development, thus providing in-
centive toward increased agricultural productivity . Ex-
portation of sheep-products and citrus fruits was greatly 
increased through improved curing, tanning, processing and 
packing. ILO established a Centre for training young Libyans 
in clerical work and industrial and mechanical skills, 
thereby broadening and stabilizing the supply of competent 
public servants, and UNESCO initiated two teacher training 
centres and numerous rural adult education projects in co-
operation with FAO. WHO and UNESCO set up maternal and 
child health centres and disease prevention programmes. 
The assistance furnished under United States bilateral aid 
is mainly concerned with projects requiring large amounts of 
capital. On the whole, however, there are continuous a t -
tempts made to integrate the two programmes so as to gain 
the highest possible level of cooperation and pfficacy . 
Valuable conclusions can be drawn from an· analysis of 
Technical Assistance in Li bya. It has been shown that the 
choice of Libya as a working example was a happy one, for 
this is a country that enjoys a unique relationship to the 
United Nations; it will always be considered a special 
responsibility or the Organization. Because the country was 
virtually without economic assets and required development 
in every field, an analysis or the Technical Assistanc e Pro-
gramme employed there indicates the complexity of the 
methods and techniques directed toward pr'oviding a flexible, 
realistic blue-print on which to plan stable, continuous 
economic development. In spite of numerous difficulties 
faced by the drafters the final plans were well -established, 
malleable and particularly suited to Libya's specific con-
ditions. The most serious obstacle was insufficient funds, 
a problem which was largely alleviated through bilateral aid . 
It is not to be assumed that bilateral aid is preferable to 
multilateral assistance. United States financial support 
provided for a specified number of years in return for cer-
tain military privileges is a two-edged sword. On the one 
hand Libya is assured financial security for at least as 
long as military installations are necessary; on the other 
she is dependent upon the bounty of another country, a 
psychological consideration that a newly independent nation 
may find difficult to accept. United Nati ons Technical As -
sistance by its very neutrality negates any such psycholo-
gical stigma. In practice the two systems have shown to 
complement each other well, the one supplying that which the 
other cannot give. It may be superfluous at this point to 
question the desirability of technical assistance for t he 
purpose of improving the conditions of underdeveloped coun-
tries, as, apart from humanitarian considerations, our 
i nterests require a world wherein the seeds of unrest and 
dissatisfaction are deracinated to prevent them from burst-
ing into conflict. The responsibility for this lies with 
the Member Nations of the United Nations, those in whose 
hands rests the power to give aid toward improving the 
economic and social conditions of underdeveloped countr i es, 
thereby minimizing the causes of future dissention. 
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Main road, usually surfaced, motorable 
Secondary road, surfaced in part, motorable 






Approximate boundaries between the French 
and British zones of occupation 
The names of ports are underlined. 
The names of anchorages are underlined with a dashed line. 
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The spellings of place names used on this map 
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